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THREE ESSAYS ON MODEL SELECTION, MODULATION ESTIMATORS
AND HERD BEHAVIOR UNDER ASYMMETRIC BELIEFS
Ahmad R. Shahidi, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2009
This thesis is organized in three chapters. In the first two chapters, an econometric
model selection procedure and a method to improve some existing estimators are pro-
posed. In the third chapter, a theoretical microeconomic analysis of herd behavior is
performed under a fairly new set of assumptions.
In chapter one, a model selection procedure based on the Penalized Empirical Like-
lihood (PEL) technique is developed, and guidelines are provided for the extension
of the procedure to the setting of Generalized Empirical Likelihood (GEL). The pro-
cedure was initially applied to linear models and was called “Least Absolute Shrink-
age and Selection Operator” (LASSO). It was subsequently extended to Generalized
Method of Moments models in, and we now extend it to Empirical Likelihood (EL)
models. Its main advantage over classical methods is in the combination of model
selection and model estimation into a single step, while improving the post-selection
properties of the resulting estimators. This procedure is easy to implement, and it
remains computationally feasible even in models with a large number of parameters.
A simulation study is performed to compare the newly proposed procedure to some
classical methods such as AIC, BIC, and DT. The simulation results show a better
iii
performance of the new procedure.
In chapter two, we define the modulation technique for the EL estimator modulation
technique pertains to the class of methods generally known as “shrinkage methods”.
Shrinkage methods are frequently used to improve the properties, in particular small-
sample properties, of existing estimators. In this paper, a general theoretical analysis
of modulation estimators is developed for EL models, along with a discussion of how
they can be implemented in special cases.
In chapter three, a theoretical model of imitation and herd behavior is considered.
It is assumed in that some participating agents have specific abilities to affect other
peoples behavior. Results are provided on how “stars” or celebrity players can impact
herd formation. In the particular setting of a financial market with a single traded asset,
results are provided on the consequences of this celebrity effect on bubble formation
in the financial market.
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1.0 MODEL SELECTION FOR MOMENT CONDITION MODELS USING
THE PENALIZED EMPIRICAL LIKELIHOOD PROCEDURE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Moment conditions are the basis for constructing estimators and making inferences
in a large number of interesting economic problems. The generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM), along with new methods based on empirical likelihood theory (Owen
1988) are the major tools to construct estimators and make inferences in the frame-
work of moment condition models. In this paper we address the problem of model
selection when the available information is in the form of moment conditions This
problem of model selection is a problem which practitioners face very often. We pro-
pose a method based on the penalized empirical likelihood procedure. This method,
unlike other existing methods, selects and estimates the right model at the same time.
As we will see in details, the proposed method is continuous in the sense that instead
of including (1) or dropping (0) a particular coefficient, it shrinks the coefficients so
that some of them will drop out. One problem with AIC, BIC, or more recent DT
methods is that they are all discrete. They either include a parameter or drop it, this
makes the procedure undesirably unstable. A small change in the data, which can be in
the form of adding new information, will result in a completely different model to be
selected. Another problem with the existing methods is that they are computationally
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very expensive, specially when the number of parameters is very large. The proposed
method addresses both of these two problems. Additionally, as we will see in the sim-
ulation results, compared to the existing methods, our method also has post-selection
superiority, and it selects the right model more often, it is easier to implement, and
computationally feasible in a model with a large number of parameters. It also has
better variance results so that the final estimators obtained using this method are better
compared to their counterparts in the RMSE (root mean squared error) sense. As a fur-
ther contribution, we will show that the penalized empirical likelihood defined in this
paper can be used to define other possibly useful procedures, and sometimes, enhance
good properties of a given estimator. For example, we will define an estimator which
is similar to EL estimator, but its implied probability measure has a larger Kullback-
Leibler (KL)-entropy than the implied probability measure of EL. Furthermore, with
our definition of penalized empirical likelihood, we are able to use the existing and
advanced framework of the penalized maximum likelihood to investigate the asymp-
totic and convergence properties of the penalized empirical likelihood procedure in a
general setting when a general penalty function is used.
In the remaining part of this introduction, I will elaborate on the heuristic origins
of the topics which will be further analyzed in this paper.
1.1.1 GMM and GEL
The generalized method of moments estimator (GMM) has been the workhorse of
econometric analysis since its introduction by Hansen (Hansen, 1982). Besides pro-
viding a unified framework to study different types of estimators, GMM extends the
method of moments framework to include situations in which the number of moment
conditions exceed the dimension of the parameter we want to estimate. Although
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GMM is a very useful estimator and it is first-order asymptotically efficient, its small
sample properties are relatively poor (Altonji and Segal, 1996; Tauchen, 1986). In
addition, the two-step nature of GMM introduces a lot of arbitrariness to the estimator.
More recently, Owen’s empirical likelihood method has provided other estima-
tors, some of which overcome some of the shortfalls of GMM estimator. This family
includes the EL estimator (Owen, 1988; Qin and Lawless, 1994; Imbens, 1997), Con-
tinuous Updating Estimator (CUE) (Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron, 1996), and the Expo-
nentially Tilting Estimator (Kitamura and Stutzer, 1997; Imbens and Johnson, 1998).
These estimators all belong to the class of Generalized Empirical Likelihood (GEL)
estimators (Smith, 1997; Newey and Smith, 2004). 1 These estimators circumvent the
need of estimating a weighting matrix in the two-step GMM by directly minimizing an
information-theory-based concept of closeness between the estimated distribution and
the empirical distribution.2 While in theory these estimators, like GMM, all have the
same first-order asymptotic efficiency, simulation studies, and Monte Carlo evidence
have shown that, compared to GMM, some members of the GEL class have better
finite-sample properties (see Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron, 1996; Ramalho, 2006 and
references therein). Also, Newey and Smith (2004) have analytically shown, using a
stochastic expansion argument, that while GMM and GEL share the same first-order
asymptotic properties, their higher-order properties are different. Specifically, while
the asymptotic bias of GMM often grows with the number of moment restrictions, the
relatively smaller bias of EL does not. Moreover, a bias-corrected EL is higher-order
1There are other varieties, too. For example the Exponentially Tilted Empirical Likelihood estimator
(ETEL) (SCHENNACH, 2007) which in essence is a combination of the two estimators, EL and ET, in
hope to obtain an estimator that like EL has a smaller finite-sample bias, and at the same time inherits
the better behavior of ET in the presence of mis-specification.
2The estimators mentioned so far are, like GMM, based on unconditional moment restrictions, using
the empirical likelihood methods, we can construct estimators based on conditional moment restrictions
see (ZHANG and GIJBELS, 2003), and Kitamura et al (2004)
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efficient relative to any other regular method of moment estimator. In terms of infer-
ence, the empirical likelihood ratio test has some desirable features too. For example,
The ELR test admits Bartlet correction (DiCiccio, Hall and Romano, 1991), which
gives it the same accuracy rate as the parametric case. Kitamura (2001) has used the
so called Generalized Neyman-Pearson approach to show that, for testing moment re-
strictions, the ELR test is uniformly most powerful in an asymptotic large deviation
sense.
1.1.2 Model Selection
Let {Mξ,ξ ∈ Ξ} be a set of candidate models for a given observation. Based on the
observed data we need to select a model from {Mξ,ξ ∈ Ξ} using an appropriate model
selection criteria, or a justified procedure which selects the desired model. Model se-
lection problems are encountered almost in every application . For instance, in linear
regression analysis, it is often of interest to select the right number of nonzero param-
eters which have the most explanatory power. With a small model, interpretation is
easier and statistical inferences can be carried out more efficiently. Also, in time series
analysis, it is essential to know the true order of an ARMA. As another example, sup-
pose we have two competing non-nested models with two different parameter vectors,
and two sets of moment conditions. The two parameter vectors can be stacked together
to yield a single parameter θ. Now we can select each model by setting the appropriate
parts of θ to zero. A model selection method tells us what part of the parameter θ
should be set to zero.
Different techniques and criteria have been developed to deal with model selection,
each having its own advantage in a particular setting.3 In the parametric likelihood-
3For a good survey of model selection literature see Rao, and WU (2001).
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based model selection we have, alongside others, the famous AIC, and BIC criteria.
When the information about the underlying density function of the data generating pro-
cess is limited to moment conditions, Andrews (1999), and Andrews, and Lu (2001)
provide downward testing (DT) and BIC-like criteria in the framework of GMM es-
timation. Also related to our work are the paper by Kolaczyk (1995), in which the
author considers an analogue of AIC model selection criterion in the empirical like-
lihood context. Also, the paper by Houng, Preston, and Shum (2003), which extends
the results of Andrews, and Lu (2001) to the setting of GEL.
As mentioned earlier, the classical methods of model selection usually involve a
computationally heavy combinatorial search. Simple model selection via AIC and
BIC, which can be applied to OLS, often select the wrong model (Breiman, 1996),
and furthermore, these procedures are unstable, meaning small changes in the data can
cause entirely different selections.4
To overcome these shortfalls Tibshirani (1996) introduced “Least absolute shrink-
age and selection operator” (LASSO).5 The lasso, which is based on the penalization
technique, combines the selection and estimation steps and therefore reduces the vari-
ance of the final estimator while using less computation resources. Model selection in
linear models is now being mostly carried out using lasso procedure. It is a compu-
tationally feasible alternative to the classical model selection methods. Furthermore,
recent studies (Zhao, and Yu 2006) have shown that under very mild conditions, the
lasso technique almost always selects the true model. In this paper we define the penal-
ized empirical likelihood, and then use it to extend the lasso method of model selection
to the framework of empirical likelihood. Although in this paper I restrict our attention
to the EL estimation, I think that the extension of the proposed technique to the more
4For further information about model selection via AIC and BIC, and their shortfalls see (FAN and
LI, 2001; FAN and LI, 2002) and the references therein.
5This method has also been extended to GMM setting, see Caner (2008).
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general setting of GEL is possible.
Since, lasso is just one example of the numerous applications of the penalization
method, it is important to perform a systematic study of the penalization method in the
context of EL estimator. In this paper we use the parametric case of penalized maxi-
mum likelihood to study the nonparametric situation of penalized empirical likelihood
procedure. We present asymptotic, and convergence rate results for the penalized EL
with a fairly general penalty function.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a powerful method of model
selection which can be used as an alternative to the existing procedures. As the simu-
lation results will show, this method not only selects the right model more often, but it
also has a better post-selection performances. In this paper, we also propose a general
framework for defining and studying the penalized El and GEL estimators. We present
results for this general case, and as an example we introduce an estimator similar to
EL whose implied probabilities have a better entropy property.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we give a formal definition
of penalized empirical likelihood estimator. In section 3 we study the problem of
model selection via PEL. Section 4 presents asymptotic and convergence results for
PEL with a general penalty function, in this section as an example of a general penalty
function we introduce another potentially important estimator. Section 5 concludes the
paper. All the proofs are collected in the appendix.
1.2 DEFINITION OF PEL
Let θ be the parameter we are interested to estimate. In general, when ln is a func-
tional which measures how well θ predicts the observed data set, X1, . . . ,Xn, and J(θ)
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is a penalty functional which assesses the physical plausibility of θ, the method of
penalization chooses a θ which optimizes
ℓnλ(θ) = ln(θ|data)−λJ(θ), λ > 0 (1.2.1)
λ is called the regularization, or sometimes penalization parameter. Larger values of λ
produces more regular estimators.
The maximum empirical likelihood procedure, much like maximum likelihood
method, is based on maximizing a criterion functional over a parameter space. There-
fore the method of penalization, should has a natural application in empirical likeli-
hood estimation. Very often, specially when the parameter space is large or not well
behaved, the optimization becomes difficult and the resulting estimators may have un-
desirable properties such as non-smoothness, inconsistency and so on. In some of
these situations the maximization can be carried out based on the penalized version
of the criterion function. In this subsection we formally introduce this idea and later
in this paper, we present some of its most important applications, and investigate the
properties of these procedures.
Definition 1:
(a) Let X1, . . . ,Xn be independently distributed random variables, with a common dis-
tribution (i.i.d). Let l(θ,Xi) be the criterion function evaluated at Xi, if J(θ) is the
penalty function we define the penalized criterion function to be
ℓ(θ,Xi) = l(θ,Xi)−λnJ(θ). (1.2.2)
(b) Let Ln(θ) = Ln(θ,X) = n−1 ∑ni=1 ℓ(θ,Xi), and ln(θ) = ln(θ,X) = n−1 ∑ni=1 l(θ,Xi).
Maximizing Ln(θ) will produce an estimator for θ. We define an approximate maxi-
mizer of Ln(θ) to be a ˆθn such that
Ln(ˆθn)≥ sup
θ∈Θ
Ln(θ)− εn, (1.2.3)
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where εn → 0 as n→ ∞.
Now we can easily adapt definition 1 to obtain a definition for the penalized em-
pirical likelihood estimator. Let
ln(θ) =−maxγ∈Rm
1
n
n
∑
i=1
log(1+ γ′g(Xi,θ)) (1.2.4)
be the profile empirical likelihood function for θ. We define the penalized empirical
likelihood as follows.
Definition 2:
The penalized empirical likelihood estimator for θ is
ˆθpel = argmax
θ∈Θ
{ln(θ)−λnJ(θ)}. (1.2.5)
Notice that, if γ∗ denotes the maximizer in (2.4), then the l(θ,Xi) in definition 1(a)
is l(θ,Xi) =−log(1+ γ′∗g(Xi,θ)).
As an example, suppose that we know from external knowledge, that the true pa-
rameter is somewhere close to a linear subspace of the parameter space, Θ. In this case
it is appropriate to try to shrink the estimator toward this linear subspace. For instance,
if L is the following linear subspace
L = {θ : θ1 = θ2 = . . . ,θr}=
{
θ : 1
r
Jθ = θ
}
, (1.2.6)
where J is a matrix of ones, J = 11′, then to shrink the estimator toward L we can use
the penalty function J(θ) = ∑ri=1( ˆθ1−θi)2.
In the following section we use the penalized EL defined in this section to con-
struct the lasso-EL, and study its properties. A general theory for convergence, and
asymptotic distribution of PEL will be developed in section 4.
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1.3 MODEL SELECTION USING PEL
As a major example of penalization method, we introduce the “Least Absolute Shrink-
age and Selection Operator” (LASSO) for the empirical likelihood setting. The easiest
way to understand the purpose and usefulness of these type of estimators, is to take a
look at the linear case. Consider the usual regression situation: we have data (xi,yi),
i = 1,2, . . . ,N, where xi = (xi1, . . . ,xip)′ and yi, are regressors and response for the ith
observation. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are obtained by minimizing
the residual squared error. There are two drawbacks to the OLS procedure. The OLS
estimates often have low bias but large variance, resulting in a poor prediction accu-
racy. As we mentioned earlier in the introduction to this paper, prediction accuracy
often can be improved by shrinking, or setting some of the coefficients to zero. By
doing so we scarify a little bias to reduce the variance, which may improve the overall
prediction accuracy. On the other, with a large number of predictors, we often prefer to
use a smaller subset that exhibits the strongest effects, in statistical literature, this pro-
cedure is called selection. The traditional tools to deal with these problems, are ridge
regression and model selection. Model selection provides interpretable models but can
be extremely variable because it is a discrete process, regressors are either retained or
dropped from the model. Small changes in the data can result in very different mod-
els being selected, which is obviously very undesirable. The ridge regression, in the
other hand, is a continuous process, and therefore more stable, and it does shrink the
coefficients. However, it does not set any coefficient to zero and hence does not give
an easily interpretable model.
Tibshirani (1996) proposes a new technique, which he calls it lasso. It shrinks
some coefficients and sets others to zero, therefore retaining the good features of both
model selection and ridge regression. This method can be promising, particularly when
9
the econometrician needs to construct a model with a large number of parameters and
then use model selection methods like BIC and AIC to select the desired model.
1.3.1 Definition and Assumptions
Let θ be a p-dimensional vector, and θ0 represent the true value, which is in the interior
of the compact set Θ ∈ Rp. As before, let the moment conditions provided by theory
to be
E[g(Xi,θ)] = 0. (1.3.1)
After using the empirical likelihood set up let
ℓn(θ) =−maxγ∈Rm
1
n
n
∑
i=1
log(1+ γ′g(xi,θ)) (1.3.2)
be the profile empirical likelihood for θ. The lasso-type-EL estimator for θ0 is a ˆθ that
maximizes
ℓn(θ)−λn
p
∑
j=1
|θ j|γ, (1.3.3)
where 0 < γ < 1 and λ is a regularization parameter. Other penalty functions are also
possible. Indeed some are proven to be more capable to achieve certain properties, see
for instance Fan and Li (2001).
1.3.1.1 Properties of Lasso-EL Estimator: In this subsection, we analyze the
consistency and large sample theory for the lasso-type-EL estimators. First we state
the assumptions required for the results which will follow.
Assumptions:
A1: (i) ∂g(x,θ)∂θ is continuous in a neighborhood of the true parameter θ0, and the rank
of E[∂g(x,θ0)∂θ ] is p.
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(ii) In a neighborhood of θ0, ||∂g(x,θ)∂θ || and ||g(x,θ)||3 are bounded by some inte-
grable function G(x).
(iii) The matrix E[g(x,θ0)g′(x,θ0)] is positive definite.
A2: (i) gi(θ) is m-dependent for all i.
(ii) |gi(θ1)−gi(θ2)| ≤ Bi|θi−θ2|, with limn→∞ ∑ni=1 E[Bdi ] < ∞, for some d > 2.
(iii) supθ∈Θ E[|gi(θ)|d] < ∞, for some d > 2.
A3: Define E[n−1 ∑ni=1 gi(θ)] = m1n(θ)
(i) m1n(θ)→m1(θ) uniformly over Θ, m1n is continuously differentiable in θ and
m1(θ0) = 0, m1(θ) 6= 0 for θ 6= θ0. Also m1(θ) is continuous in θ.
(ii) Let Rn(θ) = ∂m1n(θ)∂θ′ we assume that Rn(θ)
p−→ R(θ), uniformly in a neighbor-
hood of θ0, R(θ0) is of full rank, and R(θ) is continuous in θ.
A4: Define Wn(θ) =
[1
n ∑ni=1 gi(θ)g′i(θ)
]−1
. We assume that: Wn(θ)
p−→ W (θ) uni-
formly in θ, where W (θ) is a symmetric non-random positive definite matrix which
is continuous for all θ ∈Θ
Assumptions A1 and A2 are the usual assumptions in the empirical likelihood lit-
erature. They guarantee that there is unique maximizer, ˆθ, of the empirical likelihood
ratio. Since we will use the empirical processes theory to prove some of the up coming
results, we will be in need of assumption 3. For a good review of empirical processes
and their econometrics’ application consult Andrew (1986). Some of these assump-
tions are used by Caner (2008) to drive similar results for the GMM estimator.
The following proposition shows the consistency of the penalized estimator, under
assumptions A1-A4, and some further conditions on λn.
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Proposition 1:
If assumptions A1-A4, hold then:
I) If λn
n
→ λ0 ≥ 0, then
ˆθn
p−→ argmin
θ∈Θ
Z(θ), (1.3.4)
where
Z(θ) = m1(θ)′W (θ)m1(θ)+λ0
p
∑
i=1
|θi|γ. (1.3.5)
The convergence happens uniformly in θ.
II) If λn = o(n) then,
ˆθ p−→ θ0. (1.3.6)
We notice that Z(θ) is the limiting process of Zn(θ). And Zn(θ) is obtained by
manipulating ℓn(θ) in definition 2.
Using (I) from proposition 1, it is clear that why we need to have λn = o(n), in
order to obtain the consistency of this estimator. But this rate still is too high to get any
interesting result concerning the limiting distribution of ˆθn. To get the
√
n-consistency
it is required to have slower growth rate for λn. However, if λn grows too slowly then
we won’t get anything substantially different from the usual EL estimator. Our goal is,
to get a limiting distribution for nonzero part of the parameters which is coincide with
usual, non-penalized, EL estimator. And for the zero part of parameters the distribution
should goes zero. To achieve this goal, we need a λn which grows with a right rate.
The following proposition specifies the right conditions.
Proposition 2:
Suppose that λn
nγ/2
→ λ0 ≥ 0, and assumptions A1-A4 satisfy then:
√
n(ˆθn−θ0) = uˆn ⇒ argmin
u∈K
V (u), (1.3.7)
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where
V (u) = 2u′R(θ)′W (θ0)Ψ(θ0)+u′R(θ0)′W (θ0)R(θ0)u+λ0
p
∑
j=1
|u j|γ1{θ0 j=0}, (1.3.8)
and K is a compact subset of Rp, and Ψ(θ0) ≡ N(0,Ω(θ0)), where Ω(θ0) is the
variance-covariance matrix and
Ω(θ0) = lim
n→∞ E
[
(n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0))(n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0))′
]
. (1.3.9)
An interesting conclusion of proposition 2 is that, we can estimate nonzero param-
eters at the usual rate without introducing further asymptotic bias, while shrinking the
estimates of zero parameters to 0 with positive probability. In fact when all parameters
are non zero, θi 6= 0 i = 1, . . . ,n, we have
V (u) = argmin
u∈K
{2u′R(θ)′W (θ0)Ψ(θ0)+u′R(θ0)′W (θ0)R(θ0)u}. (1.3.10)
The solution to this minimization problem is
uˆ =−[R(θ0)′W (θ0)R(θ0)]−1R(θ0)′W (θ0)Ψ(θ0). (1.3.11)
This is the same as the limit distribution of the non-penalized EL estimator.
Now suppose that some of the parameters are indeed zero. In general when R(θ0)′W (θ0)′R(θ0)
is singular, V (u) won’t have a unique minimizer. If u ∈ argminV (u) and v lies in the
null pace of R(θ0)′W (θ0)′R(θ0), then for some t, V (u) = V (u+ tv). However, suppose
that θr+1 = · · · = θp = 0, and the null space of R(θ0)′W (θ0)′R(θ0) is spanned by the
standard basis vectors er+1, . . . ,ep; then we have
V (u) = V0(u1, . . . ,ur)+λ0
p
∑
j=r+1
|u j|γ, (1.3.12)
which has a unique minimizer. In the other words, a larger specification of the model
won’t prevent us to estimate the non-zero part of the model and the redundant part
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will be set to zero. Therefore we can, at the same time, estimate and select the correct
model. If λn grows faster than specified by preposition 2, but not too fast, in such
way that we have λn/
√
n → λ0 ≥ 0, and λn/nγ/2 → ∞, we can prove an even more
interesting result, at least asymptotically, which is usually called oracle property. To
see this assume λn/nα/2 → λ0 ≥ 0 with γ < α < 1. Suppose that θ1, . . . ,θr are nonzero
while θr+1, . . . ,θp are zero, and defining Vn(u) as in the proof of proposition 4, it
follows that Vn(u)
d−→V (u) where
V (u) =


2u′R(θ)′W (θ0)Ψ(θ0)+u′R(θ0)′W (θ0)R(θ0)u, if ur+1 = · · ·= up = 0,
∞, otherwise.
(1.3.13)
Applying the arguments given in the proof of proposition 4, it follows that
√
(n)(ˆθn−θ) d−→ argmin(V ), (1.3.14)
where the last (p−r) elements of argmin(V ) are exactly 0.6 We can summarize the ar-
gument delivered above as an corollary, which usually is referred to as oracle property
of the lasso estimator.
Corollary 1:
Suppose γ < α < 1. If λn/nα/2 → λ0 ≥ 0, and assumptions A1-A4 hold, we have
uˆn
d−→
(
uˆ1
0p−r
)
, (1.3.15)
where
uˆ1 ∼ N
(
0,
(
R(θr0)′W (θ0)R(θr0)
)−1)
, (1.3.16)
with θ0 = (θr0
′
,0′p−r)′. Note that θ0 is separated into nonzero and zero components.
6Since V can be infinite, we can no longer define convergence of Vn to V via uniform convergence
on a compact set, but instead we can define it via epiconvergence which allows for extended real-valued
functions. See sections 3 and 4 of Geyer (1994) for more details
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There are a host of other penalty functions available, some of which might be
more appropriate for special circumstances, Fan and Li (2001), review some of these
functions.
1.3.1.2 Monte Carlo Simulations The Monte Carlo simulations in this section,
are aimed at providing an answer to two important questions that a practitioner faces.
when doing applied work. First, in average which model selection method does the
best job in selecting the right model. Second, what is the post selection performance
of these methods. In this section, we compare our proposed LASSO-EL estimator
with BIC, “Downward Testing” (DT) of Andrews and Lu (2001), and LASSO-GMM
of Caner (2008). The simulation design is exactly the one in Caner (2008). I therefore
refer the interested reader to that paper for a detailed description of the design. Here
we review those aspects of the designs, which are essential for a reader to understand
the simulation process, and the proceeding results.
We have the following data generating process.
y = ˜Y θ+ ε, (1.3.17)
˜Y = ZΠ+V, (1.3.18)
where Z is N×6, Π : 6×5, V : N×5, ˜Y : N×5 represent the endogenous regressors,
and θ : 5× 1. We set N = 100. The instruments Zi : 6× 1 are i.i.d and we generate
them according to N(0, I6). ui = (εi,Vi) is independent from Zi, with εi a scalar and Vi
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is 5×1 vector. We choose ui ∼ N(0,Σ) where
Σ =


2 0.99 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.6
0.99 2 0 0 0 0
0.90 0 2 0 0 0
0.80 0 0 2 0 0
0.70 0 0 0 2 0
0.60 0 0 0 0 2


(1.3.19)
and
Π =


1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 2 0 3 0


(1.3.20)
and ui,s are generated i.i.d.
In this experiment, we take the instruments as given and will try to select and
estimate the right structural equation. Hence, all we seek is to select and estimate the
true θ0. There are two setups, in the first one θ0 = (0.8 0 0.7 0 0.9)′. The second one
has the same effects as the first one with different magnitude, θ0 = (2 0 1 0 0.5)′.
We compare the ability of each method to select the true model, and the small sample
properties of the post-selection estimators.
For LASSO-EL, and LASSO-GMM we set γ = 1/2, α = 2/3, and λN = N1/3
√
2log p.
This choice of λN has been suggested by Donoho, and Johnstone (1994) and has been
further discussed in Fan, and Li (2001). For an in-depths discussion of how BIC, and
DT methods work see Andrews and Lu (2001). Also, as mentioned before we use the
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same design as Caner (2008), and therefore for a full discussion of how we calculate
different properties of the estimators, used in this simulation study, consult that paper.
Here we report the results and drive some conclusions based on these results.
Table 1: Bias, Standard Error (SE), and RMSE of Design 1
LASSO-EL LASSO-GMM BIC DT
θi SE Bias RMSE SE Bias RMSE SE Bias RMSE SE Bias RMSE
θ1 0.1290 -0.0322 0.13291 0.1286 -0.0638 0.1435 0.2059 0.0026 0.2059 0.2144 0.0036 0.2144
θ2 0.0874 0.0009 0.0870 0.0860 -0.0017 0.0860 0.0029 -0.0003 0.0029 0.0035 -0.0002 0.0035
θ3 0.1378 -0.0291 0.1379 0.1343 -0.0538 0.1446 0.1434 -0.1067 0.1787 0.1701 0.1113 0.2033
θ4 0.0758 0.0003 0.0758 0.0758 0.0008 0.0758 0.0019 -0.0001 0.0019 0.0024 0.0003 0.0024
θ5 0.1533 -0.0376 0.1578 0.1520 -0.0718 0.1676 0.1701 -0.0716 0.2000 0.0631 0.2613 0.2688
Table 2: Bias, Standard Error (SE), and RMSE of Design 2
LASSO-EL LASSO-GMM BIC DT
θi SE Bias RMSE SE Bias RMSE SE Bias RMSE SE Bias RMSE
θ1 0.1752 -0.0791 0.1922 0.1731 -0.1622 0.2372 0.2073 0.0009 0.2073 0.2141 0.0011 0.2141
θ2 0.0991 -0.0001 0.0991 0.0986 -0.0002 0.0986 0.0032 0.0001 0.0032 0.0037 0.0007 0.0037
θ3 0.1580 -0.0385 0.1626 0.1573 -0.0813 0.1770 0.1804 -0.0597 0.1900 0.1711 -0.1016 0.1989
θ4 0.0991 -0.0003 0.0991 0.0984 -0.0006 0.0984 0.0021 0.0001 0.0021 0.0024 -0.0009 0.0025
θ5 0.1383 -0.0273 0.1409 0.1368 -0.0552 0.1475 0.0923 -0.1722 0.1953 0.0641 -0.2595 0.2673
We summarize the findings as follows: LASSO-EL picks the right model as often
as LASSO-GMM, which is very superior in choosing the right model compared to
BIC, and DT methods. While in terms of choosing the right models, LASSO-EL,
and LASSO-GMM have almost the same power, LASSO-EL almost always yields a
smaller RMES.
Remark: In this experiment our goal was to compare the lasso-El with lasso-GMM
of Caner (2008). Because GMM perform the best when the errors are distributed
according to the normal distribution, this setting is favorable to GMM. I expect that
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lasso-EL will perform even better, compared to lasso-GMM, if we consider a bad
behaved distribution. It is well known that GMM has very poor bias, and variance
when the underlying distribution is a bad behaved distribution. For instance when a
thicker-tailed or long-tailed skewed distribution (t5 and log-normal are two examples)
are used, EL does a much better job in comparison to GMM (see Ramalho 2005).
Table 3: Percentage of Correct Model
Estimators Design 1 Design 2
LASSO-EL 85.24 75.15
LASSO-GMM 84.39 74.83
BIC 67.33 45.88
DT 29.08 28.70
1.4 PEL WITH A GENERAL PENALTY FUNCTION
In this section, I investigate the large sample theory of the penalized empirical like-
lihood estimator with a fairly general penalty function. We will use the framework
developed by Cox and O’Sullivan (1990), and Shen and Wang (Shen 1994; 1997; and
Wang and Shen, 1995) to derive the asymptotic distribution of the PEL estimator, and
establish some exponential bounds on the convergence rate of ˆθn, when it is converg-
ing toward θ0. We see that, there are two forces in play. The size of local parameter
space, and the degree of penalization. To get a reasonable convergence rate, which
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also guarantee the asymptotic normality, we need to increase the degree of penaliza-
tion, λn, when the size of the local parameter space grows large. For an in-depth study
of penalization method in statistics consult the references above.
1.4.1 Asymptotic Normality
Like most cases of asymptotic analysis, we try to obtain a linearized version of the
penalized criterion function, Ln. Informally let
Sn(θ) =
∂Ln(θ)
∂θ (1.4.1)
we want to expand Sn around the true parameter θ0 and then study its behavior when
n→ ∞. Off course we hope the limiting score function, S(θ) exists and we have
S(θ) = ∂l(θ)∂θ −λ
∂J(θ)
∂θ (1.4.2)
where l(θ) is the limiting version of ln(θ). To formally develop an asymptotic theory
for PEL, we accept the framework of Shen 1997, and use the empirical process theory
to find the limiting distribution of our estimator. Before we be able to do all of that,
we need to introduce some notations, and regularity conditions.
Suppose, for all θ ∈ Θ and all x, there exists l′θ0(θ−θ0,x) such that the remainder
in the linear approximation can be written as
r(θ−θ0,x) = l(θ,x)− l(θ0,x)− l′θ0(θ−θ0,x), (1.4.3)
where l′θ0(θ−θ0,x) is defined as
lim
t→0
l(θ(θ0, t),x)− l(θ0,x)
t
, (1.4.4)
and θ(θ0, t)∈Θ is a path in t connecting θ0 and θ such that θ(θ0,0) = θ0 and θ(θ0,1) =
θ. A good choice for θ(θ0, t) is θ0 + t(θ−θ0), which is linear in t. In this case, l′θ0(θ−
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θ0,x) becomes the directional derivative of l(θ) at θ0. Here we consider the general
case because, in some cases we don’t have any other choice but facing a nonlinear
form of θ(θ0, t). Let ‖·‖s be a norm different from ‖·‖, (it is often chosen to be the
Sobolev norm when it is appropriate to do so) such that ‖·‖ ≤ α‖·‖s, and assume that
the convergence rate of the PEL estimator under ‖·‖ and ‖·‖s, be op(δn) and op(δsn)
respectively.
Suppose f is a functional with the following smoothness property: for all θ ∈ {θ ∈
Θ : ‖θ−θ0‖ ≤ δsn},
| f (θ)− f (θ0)− f ′θ0(θ−θ0)| ≤O(‖θ−θ0)‖w) as ‖θ−θ0‖→ 0, (1.4.5)
where w > 0 is the degree of smoothness of f at θ0, and
f ′θ0(θ−θ0) = limt→0
f (θ(θ0, t),x)− f (θ0,x)
t
(1.4.6)
in this way f ′θ0(θ−θ0) is linear in (θ−θ0) and ‖ f ′θ0‖< ∞, where
‖ f ′θ0‖= sup{θ∈Θ:‖θ−θ0‖>0}
| f ′θ0(θ−θ0)|
‖θ−θ0‖ . (1.4.7)
Let V be the space spanned by Θ−θ0, and suppose that ‖·‖ induces an inner prod-
uct, 〈·,·〉, on the completion of V , which we show it be ¯V . By the Rise representation
theorem, there exists v∗ ∈ ¯V such that, for any θ ∈ Θ, f ′θ0(θ−θ0) = 〈θ−θ0,v∗〉. Fur-
thermore, let εn = o(n−1/2) and for all θ ∈ {θ ∈Θ : ‖θ−θ0‖ ≤ δsn}
θ∗(θ,εn) = (1− εn)θ+ εn(u∗+θ0) ∈Θ, with u∗ =±v∗ (1.4.8)
Let K(θ0,θ) = n−1 ∑ni=1 E
[
l(θ0,Xi)− l(θ,Xi)
]
, which is the Kullback-Leibler in-
formation measure based on n observation when l(θ,X) is a likelihood function, and
let
νn(g) = n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
(
g(Xi)−Eg(Xi)
) (1.4.9)
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be the empirical process induced by g.
Now we are in a position to formulate some regularity conditions, under which we
can derive the asymptotic distribution of f (ˆθn).
Assumptions:
A5: (Stochastic equicontinuity). For the reminder function, r(., .), defined above we
have:
(i)
sup
{θ∈Θ:‖θ−θ0‖s≤δsn}
n−1/2νn
(
r(θ−θ0,X)− r(θ∗(θ,ε)−θ0,X)
)
= Op(ε2n). (1.4.10)
(ii)
sup
{θ∈Θ:‖θ−θ0‖s≤δsn}
n−1/2νn
(
r(θ−θ0,X)
)
= Op(εn). (1.4.11)
A6:
sup
{θ∈Θ:‖θ−θ0‖s≤δsn}
[
K(θ0,θ∗(θ,εn))−K(θ0,θ)
]
− 1
2
[
‖θ∗(θ,ε)−θ0‖2−‖θ−θ0‖2
]
= O(ε2).
(1.4.12)
A7: For some constant c > 0 and any θi ∈ {θ ∈Θ : ‖θ−θ0‖s ≤ δsn}, i = 1,2, we have
J(θ1 +θ2)≤ c
(
J(θ1)+ J(θ2)
)
. (1.4.13)
In addition, λn = O(εn) and J(v∗) < ∞.
A8: We have:
sup
{θ∈Θ:‖θ−θ0‖s≤δsn}
= n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(θ−θ0)
)
= Op(ε). (1.4.14)
The following result proves the asymptotic normality of the PEL estimator.
21
Proposition 3:
Suppose assumptions A5-A8 are satisfied and f is a function which satisfies (4.5) with
δsn = O(n−1/2) and Var0(l′θ0(v
∗,X))< ∞. Then, for the approximate plug-in penalized
estimator f (ˆθ) we have
n1/2
( f (ˆθ)− f (θ0)) p−→ N
(
0,Var0(l′θ0(v
∗,X))
)
. (1.4.15)
The following corollary is a direct consequence of proposition 1.
Corollary 2:
If assumptions A1-A4 hold, then for the approximate penalized estimator, ˆθ, we have
n1/2〈ˆθ−θ0,s〉 p−→ N
(
0,Var0(l′θ0(s,X)
)
, (1.4.16)
where s ∈Θ−θ0.
Typically, Var(l′θ0(ˆθn−θ0)) = ‖ f ′θ0‖2.
1.4.2 Rate of Convergence
In this subsection of the paper, we use the results of Shen (1998) to obtain some prob-
ability bounds for the convergence of penalized EL estimator.
We first introduce some notation and list the regularity assumptions, which we will
need to obtain the results of this section. Let ln(θ|data) be the criterion function that
we discussed earlier, which measures how well a model with parameter θ predicts the
observed data. We define Kn(θ,θ0) = |E
[
ln(θ)− ln(θ0)
]|. Now we define ρn(θ,θ0) =
K1/2n (θ,θ0), ρn(θ,θ0) will be used to measure the distance between two parameter
points. In this context, which ln(θ) represents the log empirical likelihood function,
K(θ,θ0) becomes the Kullback-Leiber information criteria. Let V (θ,θ0) =Var
(
l(θ)−
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l(θ0)
)
, where l(θ) is the limit of ln(θ) when the sample size grows large. Also we
define for any ki > 0,
A(k1,k2) = {θ ∈Θ : k1 ≤ ρ(θ0,θ)≤ 2k1, J(θ)≤ k2}, (1.4.17)
and
B(k1,k2) = {l(θ)− (θ0) : θ ∈ A(k1,k2)}. (1.4.18)
Let Pi be the probability measure on a measurable space Xi induced by the density
pi(θ0,x). Define P = n−1 ∑ni=1 Pi. Expectation E and Ei are evaluated under P and Pi
respectively. Now we are in a position to state the required assumptions.
Assumptions:
A9: For some 0≤ β < 1 and c1 > 0,
sup
A(k1,k2)
V (θ0,θ)≤ c1k21
(
1+(k21,k2)β
)
. (1.4.19)
A10: There exists a random variable W (Zi), such that
|l(θ,Yi)− l(θ0,Y0)| ≤ |θ(Xi)−θ0(Xi)|W (Zi), (1.4.20)
where {Xi} and {Zi} are independent. Also, supi Ei
[
exp(t0W (Zi))
]
<∞ and E
[
(θ(X)−
θ0(X))2
]≤ c2V (θ0,θ), with t0 > 0 and c2 > 0. Furthermore,
sup
A(k1,k2)
‖θ−θ0‖ ≤ c3(k21 + k2)γ. (1.4.21)
For 0≤ γ < 1, and c3 > 0, the norm is the supermom norm on Θ.
A11: We have
sup
{k1≥1,k2≥1}
Ψ(k1,k2)≤ c4n1/2, (1.4.22)
where Ψ(k1,k2) =
R U
L H1/2(u,B(k1,k2))du/L with U = c5ε(k21 + k2)(1+max(β,γ))/2, and
L = c6λn(k21 + k2), and c5,c6 > 0.7
7H(u,B) is called the Hellinger metric entropy. For a definition see the appendix. For more informa-
tion consult Kolomogorov and Tihomirov (1959)
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The following results establish some exponential probability bounds on the rate of
convergence for the penalized EL estimator.
Proposition 4:
If assumptions A5-A7 are satisfied. Then there exists a constant c8 > 0 such that for
any ε stisfying assumption A7, and max(J(θ0),1)λn ≤ c7ε2. We have
P∗
(
sup
{pho(θ0,θ)≥ε,θ∈Θ}
n−1
n
∑
i=1
(
ℓ(θ,Yi)− ℓ(θ0,Yi)
)≥−ε2/2) (1.4.23)
≤ 7exp(−c8n min(λ2n/ε2,λn)),
where the P∗ is the outer measure (see for example Pollard (1984)).
The following corollary gives the bounds for the estimator ˆθ.
Corollary 3:
Suppose assumptions A9-A11 are satisfied. Then for the penalized estimator defined
in definition (1b) with an = o(ε2n), we have
P
(
ρ(θ0, ˆθ)≥ ζ)≤ 7exp(−c8nζ2n), (1.4.24)
where ζn = max(εn,λ1/2n ) with εn the smallest ε satisfying assumption A11. The best
possible rate can be obtained by setting λn ∼ ε2n.
Proposition 4 essentially says that, the rate of convergence is determined by equa-
tion (4.22) of assumption A11, which relates the size of the parameter space, the local
behavior of the profile empirical likelihood function, and the degree of penalization
(λn). We clearly see that when εn is large, which is an indicator of a large parameter
space in a neighborhood of θ0, we need to increase λn, the degree of penalization, in
order to get an acceptable convergence rate.
Remarks 1: Method of sieve is another important statistical method, which is very
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close to the method of penalization. In sieve approximation, like the penalization
method, we often have a very large parameter space, and optimization on the whole
space does not produces any meaningful estimator. In penalization technique, we re-
strict the optimization to a manageable subspace and then carry out the optimization.
In sieve method, we carry out the optimization within a subset which is dense in the
original parameter space. More formally, if Θn is a sequence of spaces dense in Θ, for
every θ ∈ Θ there exists θn ∈ Θn such that ‖θn−θ‖ → 0. A sieve estimate ˆθn, is an
optimizer of the criterion over Θn.
Remark 2: Another very important method which has close connection with penaliza-
tion method, is the Bayesian method. We can interpret the penalty function as formu-
lating prior knowledge about the unknown parameters. More specifically, constructing
a prior such that the posterior distribution is supported on a desirable set with large
probability. This suggests that one way to construct a Bayesian empirical likelihood
estimator, is to try to do it via penalization method.8
1.4.3 Example: Penalized Minimum Distance
Since using the empirical likelihood methods, we estimate two sets of parameters, the
unknown parameter θ0, and the probability distribution p = (p1, . . . , pn), we can use
the penalization method to construct better distributions. In this subsection we try do
that.
Penalty functions an be design to take care of unnecessary small pi in implied
probability distribution, or just to take account of external information that the econo-
metrician might have. In this section we study the penalized empirical likelihood, in
which the penalty function is designed to regulate the implied probability measure in
8There has been attempt to construct Bayesian EL estimators, (S. Schennach 2005, and N. Lazar
2004), although the authors have taken other roots.
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order to get a measure as close as possible to the maximum entropy measure. As it is
mentioned earlier in this paper, people have used a combination of empirical likelihood
and exponential tilting by embedding the implied probabilities of exponential tilting
procedure in the criterion function of empirical likelihood estimator, see for instance
Jing and Wood (1996), Corcoran (1998), Schennach (2007), and Smith (2005). The
penalized method, introduced here, attempt to combine EL and ET methods too. Here
we use the implied probability measures of the EL procedure, but use the exponential
tilting criterion to penalize those pˆi(θ) which are not in agreement with ET criterion.
More studies need to investigate the properties of this new estimator, but it seems to
me that this procedure is more in line with statistical theory. There is a big literature
studying the penalized methods, but simply plug in the implied probabilities of one
procedure to the criterion function of another procedure might seem a little ad hoc.
For a data set Xn = {x1, . . . ,xn}, let Pn be the empirical distribution which assigns
equal weights to each xi. For a given distribution P let d(P,Pn) be a distance defined
on the space of probability measures. Furthermore, assume that
ℓn(θ) =−maxγ∈Rm
1
n
n
∑
i=1
log(1+ γ′g(xi,θ)) (1.4.25)
be the profile empirical likelihood, obtained after accounting for the moment condi-
tions E[g(Xi,θ)] in the following definition, we define the penalized minimum distance
estimator.
Definition 3:
The penalized minimum distance empirical likelihood estimator for θ is ˆθn such that
ˆθn = argmax
θ∈Θ
{ℓn(θ)−λnd(P,Pn)} (1.4.26)
where P = (p1, . . . , pn) and
pi =
1
1+ γ′g(xi,θ)
(1.4.27)
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In definition 3, J(θ) = d(P,Pn). For instance, KL is a distance measure which
if used in the above definition, will penalise p′is in such way that the final estimator
will have implied probabilities with higher entropy. There are various distances, like
Hollinger distance, Kolmogorov-Smimov distance and so on. Depending on what we
expect the estimator to achieve, different measures can be used. the most commonly
used distance measure is the KL which was introduced earlier.
Schennach (2007) has investigated the first and second order properties of the
ELET estimator. In a nutshell this estimator is a compromise between EL and ET
estimators, and therefore one should expect to see that, ETEL has a better behavior
under miss-specification compared to EL, and at the same time has better second order
bias properties compared to ET. In fact ELET has the same higher order bias and vari-
ance properties as EL. I expect the penalized estimator, introduce here has the same
higher order properties too. The source of these better performance is the EL criterion
function which our estimator is based on it, too. I intend to do a more in-depth study
of the first and higher order properties of this estimator.
1.5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper extends the “least absolute shrinkage and selection operator” to the frame-
work of empirical likelihood estimation. It also provides a guideline to implement it for
the more general setting of GEL. We show how this procedure is able to consistently
select the best possible model. The simulation results show the better performance of
LASSO-EL compared to the classical AIC, BIC, and DT criteria. Also, we see from
the presented simulation results that better bias property of EL estimator (compared to
GMM) is carried out to the LASSO-EL too, in a way that the LASSO-EL has better
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post-selection preference than LASSO-GMM has.
As by a product, we investigate the large sample properties of the penalized em-
pirical likelihood in setting with a fairly general penalty function. One interesting
conclusion is that, the rate of convergence depends on the complexity of the parameter
space, as measured by the Hellinger metric entropy (HME), around θ0, and the degree
of penalization λn. We saw that, the higher the HME, the bigger the degree of penal-
ization has to be in order to get a faster rate of convergence. In other words, while
the consistency of the penalized estimator is determined by the global behaviour of the
criterion, the rate of that convergence and therefore the asymptotic normality of the
estimator is determined by the local behavior of the criterion. Finally, We presented
other forms of penalty functions which they might be able to produce estimators with
possibly important properties. Studying the properties of these estimators is a subject
of future studies.
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2.0 MODULATION METHOD FOR EMPIRICAL LIKELIHOOD
ESTIMATOR
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Empirical likelihood (El) (Owen 1988) is regarded as the non-parametric version of
parametric likelihood procedure. Its robustness against distributional assumptions on
one hand, and its good properties analogous, to the parametric likelihood, on the other
hand, make it a very powerful tool when it is applied to the moment condition models
in econometric applications. GMM (Hansen 1982) and other recently developed tech-
niques based on Empirical Likelihood (Owen, 1988; Qin and Lawless, 1994; Imbens,
1997) use a set of given moment conditions to construct estimators for the unknown
parameters. In this paper, and a companion paper (Shahidi 2008) we study the use
of shrinkage techniques in improving the empirical likelihood procedure. While this
paper introduces the modulation method, the other paper deals with penalization tech-
nique. Modulation, and penalization methods belong to the wider class of shrinkage
procedures. Shrinkage methods enable us to use extra information, and incorporate
prior beliefs into the estimation. For instance, in the penalization method one can con-
struct the penalty function based on the external information she wants to take into
account. Shrinkage methods are also useful in correcting some undesirable features of
some class of estimators. In this paper we develop a general framework, in which, one
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can study different estimators using the modulation techniques. Using this framework,
we introduce several examples of new estimators, and examine their properties.
The remaining part of this introduction, is devoted to the heuristic origins of the
topics which will be further analyzed in the following sections.
2.1.1 GMM and GEL
Generalized method of moments estimator (GMM) has been the workhorse of econo-
metric analysis since its introduction by Hansen (1982). Besides providing a unified
framework to study different types of estimators, GMM extends the method of mo-
ments framework to include situations in which the number of moment conditions ex-
ceed the dimension of the parameter we want to estimate. Although the GMM estima-
tor has desirable properties, such as being first-order asymptotically efficient, its small
sample properties are relatively poor (Altonji and Segal, 1996; Tauchen 1986). More
recently, Owen’s empirical likelihood method has provided other estimators, some of
which overcome some of the shortfalls of the GMM. From this family we have the EL
estimator (Owen, 1988; Qin and Lawless, 1994; Imbens, 1997), Continuous Updating
Estimator (CUE) (Hansen and Yaron, 1996), and the Exponentially Tilting Estima-
tor (Kitamura and Stutzer, 1997; Imbens and Johnson, 1998) which all belong to the
class of Generalized Empirical Likelihood (GEL) estimators (Smith, 1997; Newey and
Smith, 2004). 1 These estimators circumvent the need of estimating a weighting ma-
trix in the two-step GMM by directly minimizing an information-theory-based concept
of closeness between the estimated distribution and the empirical distribution.2 While
1There are other varieties, too. For example the Exponentially Tilted Empirical Likelihood estimator
(ETEL) (SCHENNACH, 2007) which in essence is a combination of the two estimators, EL and ET, in
hope to obtain an estimator that like EL has a smaller finite-sample bias, and at the same time inherits
the better behavior of ET in the presence of mis-specification.
2The estimators mentioned so far are, like GMM, based on unconditional moment restrictions, using
the empirical likelihood methods, we can construct estimators based on conditional moment restrictions,
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in theory these estimators, like GMM, all have the same first-order asymptotic effi-
ciency, simulation works and Monte Carlo evidences have shown that, compared to
GMM, some members of the GEL class have better finite-sample properties (Hansen
and Yaron, 1996; Ramalho, 2006) and references therein. Also, Newey and Smith
(2004) have analytically shown, using a stochastic expansion argument, that while
GMM and GEL share the same first-order asymptotic properties, their higher-order
properties are different. Specifically, while the asymptotic bias of GMM often grows
with the number of moment restrictions, the relatively smaller bias of EL does not.
Moreover, a bias-corrected EL is higher-order efficient relative to any other regular
method of moment estimator. In term of inferences, the empirical likelihood ratio test
has some desirable features too. For example ELR test admits Bartlet correction, Di-
Ciccio, Hall, Romano (1991), which gives the same accuracy rate as the parametric
case. Kitamura (2001) used the so called Generalized Neyman-Pearson approach to
show that for testing moment restriction the ELR test is uniformly most powerful in an
asymptotic large deviation sense.
2.1.2 Shrinkage and Modulation
Shrinkage is a general method in statistics for improving an estimator and regularizing
ill-posed inference problems. Commonly used procedures like Bayesian inference,
and penalized likelihood inference, implicitly use the shrinkage technique.
In this part of the introduction, I will use the simple ordinary least square (OLS)
to demonstrate how the shrinkage method works, and also we hope to justify its use-
fulness. The Gauss-Markov theorem states that among all linear unbiased estimators,
the OLS has the smallest variance, but this property which sometimes is called BLUE
too. See (ZHANG and GIJBELS, 2003), and Kitamura et al (2004)
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“Best linear Unbiased Estimator” does not yield the best estimator in the sense of MSE
“Mean Squared Errors”. In the other words, if we drop the unbiased restriction we can
do better in MSE sense. To demonstrate it, assume ˆβi is the OLS estimator of βi, and
define ˜βi = 11+λ ˆβi. We notice that if λ = 0; we get the OLS estimator back, and when
λ is too large, ˜βi shrinks to zero. Furthermore, E ˜βi = 11+λ E ˆβi = 11+λ βi, therefore ˜βi is
a biased estimator of βi.
The MSE of ˜βi can be written as
Kσ2(
1
1+λ)
2 +(
λ
1+λ)
2
K
∑
i=1
β2i . (2.1.1)
The first part is the variance component, which is the largest when λ is zero. The
second part is the squared bias and it grows with λ. In principal with the right choice
of λ, we can get an estimator which does better than the OLS in MSE sense. This new
estimator is not unbiased, but what we pay for in bias, we make up for in variance. The
first order condition gives the optimal choice for λ as
λ = Kσ
2
∑β2i
. (2.1.2)
Although this choice of λ is not feasible, it is possibler to find good estimations for
it. For example we can replace σ with an unbiased estimation of variance, and also
replacing β with some appropriate estimation of β. Two of the most mentioned fea-
sible estimators of λ are James-Stein estimator (James and Stein, 1961), and Sclove
estimator (Sclove, 1968).
We can summarize the construction of this new estimator as follows: First, we used
the scalar parameter λ to obtain an equation in which a new parameter, ˜β, depends on
the OLS estimator through the parameter λ; this step is called modulation. Second,
we have a criterion which we are looking to optimize; here we want to minimize the
MSE risk of the estimator. Third, this minimization yields us an optimal choice for
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the newly introduced parameter λ, which in turn results in a new estimator which
has a better MSE compared to the OLS estimator. In Beran, and Du¨mbgen (1998)
terminology, the parameter λ, is called a modulator. They extended this argument
roughly in the following manner. Let ˆβ = ( ˆβ1, . . . , ˆβn), then the modulated parameter
is ˜β = (λ1 ˆβ1, . . . ,λn ˆβ), and therefore the modulator is the n-dimensional vector λ =
(λ1, . . . ,λn)
In this paper, we will use a method similar to “modulation estimator” (Beran and
Du¨mbgen, 1998) to obtain a new modulation of the old estimator. Then we use an ap-
propriate criterion to pick the best “modulator” which gives the best estimator, judged
by the chosen criterion . The procedure that we are trying to implement can be sum-
marized as follow:
1. Modulation: Use modulators to modulate the estimator to a family of estimators,
depending on the modulator.
2. Selecting a criterion: Use a criterion to choose the best modulator. The criterion
is usually a risk function, evaluating the risk associated with a given estimator.
Because in El estimation method we estimating two entities, the unknown param-
eter θ, and the multinominal distribution p = (p1, . . . , pn), we can use a criterion
which measures the goodness of a distribution like p. Both of these methods are
discussed in the section two of this paper.
3. Adaptation: Find a modulator that optimizes the given criterion.
2.1.3 Other Interpretations for λ
So far we have considered the modulator, λ = (λ1, . . . ,λn), to be a purely mathematical
tool which helps to change, construct and choose form, the already known estimators.
Another possible interpretation of the vector λ = (λ1, . . . ,λn) is to consider λ as a vec-
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tor of weights. Weighting is commonly used in econometrics and statistics to account
for specific structure of a data set. Interpreting w as weights will result in a weighted
empirical likelihood, which we hope to take account of heteroskedasticity in the data.
If the data under consideration possesses an unknown structure, for instance, we are
aware of a heteroskedasticity in the data, but the exact structure of it is unknown. In
this case, we use an unknown vector of weights w = (w1, . . . ,wn), and then by us-
ing some criteria, we try to choose the best weights according to that criteria. The
weighting vector w can be considered as kernel weights. Instead of maximizing the
empirical distribution we might want to maximize a smoothed version of the empirical
distribution, which requires weighting by a smoothing kernel.
This paper contributes to the EL literature in two ways. First, we introduce the
modulation method in the empirical likelihood framework. This method enables us to
study several different estimators using the same theoretical framework. For example,
when the modulators are interpreted as weighting vectors, we can define and study the
weighted empirical likelihood procedure. Second, we use the modulation method in
some well known econometrics and statistical models, like GLM model. We study
them analytically, and conduct Monte Carlo simulations, which shows the improved
estimators indeed work better then the original ones, specially when the sample size is
very small. Although, we focus our attention on EL procedure in this paper, extending
the results to the more general setting of GEL is not very far off.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we introduce the modula-
tion technique and use it to construct new EL estimators. In section 3 we study GLM
as an example, we use this technique to obtain an estimator for the generalized linear
model, GLM, (Kolaczyk, 1994; Chen and Cui, 2003). We will show that this estimator
has a lower variance than the traditional quasi-likelihood estimator of the GLM mod-
els. Section 4 reports the outcome of some Monte Carlo simulations, and section 5
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concludes the paper, while all proofs are collected in the appendix.
2.2 MODULATION METHOD
In this section, we try to implement the three steps which we discussed in the previous
section. We first present an example, which shows how the method works in a linear
setting. This example is a slightly modified version of Beran (2000). We construct an
estimation for a density function f , which we hope to show how modulation method
works.
2.2.1 How Modulation Works
As we explained above, this subsection serves as an illustration of the modulation
method. We hope a reader who might be unfamiliar with this method can gain enough
insight from this example to follow the rest of this paper.
Definition 4:
A modulator is a vector w = (w1, . . . ,wn), where wi ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, . . . ,n.
Now we define a modulation estimator.
Definition 5:
A modulation estimator is a component-wise linear estimator of the form
ˆθ(w) = (w1 ˆθ1, . . . ,wn ˆθn), (2.2.1)
where w is a modulator.
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Suppose that
Yi = f (xi)+σεi (2.2.2)
, where εi ∼ N(0,1) and xi = 1/n.
Assume f ∈ L2[0,1] therefore we can expand it as
f (x) =
∞
∑
i=1
θiφi(x) and θi =
Z
( f (x)φidx (2.2.3)
where {φi}∞1 is an orthonormal basis for L2[0,1]. Define ˆθ j = 1n ∑ni=1Yiφ j(xi) therefore
E( ˆθ j) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
E(Yi)φ j(xi) = 1
n
n
∑
i=1
f (xi)φ j(xi) (2.2.4)
≈
Z
f (x)φi(x)dx = θ j (2.2.5)
and
Var(ˆθ j) =
1
n2
n
∑
i=1
Var(Yi)φ2j(xi) =
σ2
n2
n
∑
i=1
φ2j(xi)≈
σ2
n2
Z
φ2j(x)dx =
σ2
n2
. (2.2.6)
Considering the dimensionality of the data set, ˆfn(y) = ∑ni=1 ˆθiφi(y) is a good estimator
for f (y). The estimator ˆθ = (ˆθ1, . . . , ˆθn) often results in a ˆfn(y) which has very poor
risk. Using modulators we can improve the risk of ˆfn(y). Let ˆθ(w) = (w1 ˆθ1, . . . ,wn ˆθn).
By Parsevel equality, the loss function is
L( ˆfn, fn) =
Z
( ˆfn(y)− fn(y))2 (2.2.7)
=
n
∑
i=1
(wiθi−θi)2 (2.2.8)
therefore the risk function is
R( ˆfn, fn) = E[L( ˆfn, fn)] (2.2.9)
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=
n
∑
i=1
(
wi
σ2
n
+(1−wi)2θ2i
)
(2.2.10)
An unbiased estimator for the risk function can be obtained, by replacing θi by ˆθi and
σ2 by an unbiased estimator of σˆ2.
ˆR(w) =
n
∑
i=1
(
ˆθi− σˆ
2
n
)
(1−wi)2 + σˆ
2
n
n
∑
i=1
w2i (2.2.11)
now the minimum risk estimator for f (y) is obtained by using ˆθ(w∗), where w∗ is the
minimizer of ˆR(w).
Therefore to obtain the modulation estimator, first we derived an estimator for the
density function f . Then in the second stage, we modulated this estimator and obtained
a family of estimators ˆf wn for f . And finally in the third stage, we used a criteria to
compare the members of this family and choose the best one which we show it by ˆf w∗n .
We now perform this three-steps procedure for the empirical likelihood estimator. The
main difference, from the setting discussed above, is that the modulations we consider
here are no longer necessarily linear.
2.2.2 Modulated EL
Definition 3 defines both what a modulator is, and what we mean by a modulation
estimator in a nonlinear setting.
Definition 6:
We define:
1. A “modulator” is a vector w = (w1, . . . ,wn) where w j ∈ R, for j = 1,2, . . . ,n
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2. A “modulation estimator” is a component-wise estimator of the form
ˆθ(w) = (ˆθ1(w), . . . , ˆθn(w)) (2.2.12)
where w is a modulator.
The idea is, to derive a class of estimators in a manner that all of them satisfy the
desired sample moment conditions, and furthermore, each one depends on the modu-
lator w. To achieve this, we change the objecting function used in empirical likelihood
estimation in such a way that the new objective function depends on the modulator w.
Obviously there are more than one way to do this, but we should be able to provide
reasonable interpretations for any selected procedure. Below, we propose one of these
ways, which we think has a very natural interpretation as weighted empirical likeli-
hood. In lemma 2, we show that this procedure in equivalent to another one which
is easy to interpret too, and therefore we can use them interchangeably. Later in this
paper we discuss the weighting interpretation in details.
Definition 7:
For a modulator w = (w1,w2, . . . ,wn) define
pˆ(w) = argmin
p1,...,pn
n
∑
i=1
−wi log pi (2.2.13)
subject to:
n
∑
i=1
pigi(θ) = 0 and
n
∑
i=1
pi = 1 (2.2.14)
notice that here gi(θ) = g(xi,θ).
The following lemma shows that every solution to the minimization in definition 2,
can be manipulated to get a solution for another minimization problem, which some-
times is easier to implement.
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Lemma 1:
Let pˆ(w) be the solution obtained from definition 2, then there exits a solution qˆ(ϖ) to
the following minimization problem
min
q1,...,qn
n
∑
i=1
− logqi (2.2.15)
subject to:
n
∑
i=1
qigi(θ)ϖi = 0 and
n
∑
i=1
qi = 1, (2.2.16)
where ϖ = (ϖ1, . . . ,ϖn) is a new modulator.
Proof. See the appendix
Since adding extra constraints does not increase the variance of the EL estimators,
Qin and Lawless (1994), Newey and Smith (2004) we might be able to achieve better
estimators by adding some extra constrains which help us to use more information
or more efficiently the same information, to estimate the parameters. Using the idea
of modulators, introduced by definition 2 and lemma 1 we can develop an extended
version of EL estimator, by adding extra moment conditions to the set of original
moment conditions. The following definition introduce this modification and later in
this paper we show, through an example using GLM (generalized linear models), how
to use this modification, along with a modulator, to construct better estimators.
Definition 8:
Let g(Xi,θ) = gi = (g1i , . . . ,gki ), h1i = (g
l1
i , . . . ,g
l j
i ), h2i = (g
t1
i , . . . ,g
t j′
i ), {l1, . . . , l j} ∪
{t1, . . . , t ′j} = {1, . . . ,k} and hi = (h1i ,h2i ). Let w = (w1, . . . ,wn) be a modulator as
in definition 1, the extended EL estimator for θ is the estimator obtained from EL
procedure by replacing the constrain ∑ni=1 pigi = 0 with the new constrain ∑ni=1 pi(h1i +
wih2i ) = 0
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Remark: This definition can be considered as a generalization of definition 2.
By setting h1i = 0 and h2i = gi we get definition 2. Also, it should be noticed that, if
j + j′ > k, then the number of original moment conditions, k, has been extended, and
some new moment conditions have been added to the original set. This proves to be
useful specially in cases that, the number of moment conditions are the same as the
number of parameters.
All the procedures introduced so far, have the important feature of linking the esti-
mator of θ to the vector w = (w1, . . . ,wn). In the other words all the maximization pro-
cedures, introduced above, yield us an estimator for the empirical probability measure
p = (p1, . . . , pn), pˆ(w), and as a by product, we obtain an estimator for the unknown
parameter θ, which we show it by ˆθ(w). To see this, we set up the Lagrangian
L =−
n
∑
i=1
log(pi)+λ′
n
∑
i=1
pigi(θ)wi +µ
( n∑
i=1
pi−1
) (2.2.17)
where µ ∈R and λ ∈Rp are the Lagrange multipliers. It takes some simple algebra to
show that the first order conditions are solved by
µˆ = n, λ(θ) = argmin
λ∈Rp
−
n
∑
i=1
log(1+λ′gi(θ)wi) (2.2.18)
and
pˆ(θ) = 1
n(1+ ˆλ(θ)′gi(θ)wi)
(2.2.19)
therefore the likelihood profile will be
ℓ(θ) = min
λ∈Rp
−
n
∑
i=1
log(1+λ′gi(θ)wi)−n logn (2.2.20)
finally the empirical likelihood estimator for θ is
ˆθ = argmax
θ∈Θ
ℓ(θ) = argmax
θ∈Θ
min
λ∈Rp
−
n
∑
i=1
log(1+λ′gi(θ)wi) (2.2.21)
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As we notice, both estimators, the estimator for θ, ˆθ(w), and the estimator for the
empirical distribution P, ˆP = (pˆ1(ˆθ(w)), . . . , pˆn(ˆθ(w))), depend on the modulator w.
In this manner we have a class of estimators for the empirical measure, and a class of
estimators for the unknown parameter θ
ˆP = {pˆ(w)|w ∈W} and ˆΘ = {ˆθ(w)|w ∈W} (2.2.22)
where W is the set of all allowable modulators.
Definition 2, resembles the definition of empirical likelihood estimator, with the
exception of coefficients wi. These wi’s can be interpreted as weights or just a math-
ematical device to modulate and construct new estimators. Our goal is, to show that
this device is indeed a useful one which helps us to find estimators with better desired
properties. Later in this paper we discuss weighting and other interpretations of the
wi’s.
The following lemma shows that every member of ˆΘ along with the corresponding
pˆ(w) ∈ ˆP satisfies the moment conditions.
Lemma 2:
Let modulator w = (w1, . . . ,wn) be given, then the estimator ˆθ(w), and its correspond-
ing implied probabilities pˆ(w), given by definition 2, exist and satisfy the sample mo-
ment conditions.
Proof. See the appendix
Now that we have a set of estimators, ˆΘ, and the sample moment conditions are
satisfied using whatever member of this set, we need some criteria to choose from this
set of estimators. This leads us to the second step of the procedure introduced earlier
in the introduction,“risk estimation”. Since, we are estimating two unknowns, the em-
pirical distribution and the models’ parameter θ, we have several options for using an
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appropriate criteria. First, we will explain how to choose the best empirical measure
from the set ˆP. As we will see, this is much simpler than trying to estimate the risk of
a given estimator. Because choosing the appropriate empirical distribution is achieved
by choosing a suitable modulator, w0 = (w01, . . . ,w0n), and because given the modulator
w0 we can pick the estimator ˆθ(w0), the procedure of choosing an appropriate empiri-
cal measure yields us an estimator for θ with the best implied probabilities judged by
the given criteria.
2.2.3 The Minimum distance Criteria
There are a host of metrics available to quantify the distance between two given mea-
sures. Although some are not metrics in the mathematical sense of the word, but pos-
sess a notion of “distance” which have been proven to be useful. Among many such
distance measures we restrict ourselves to the forward Kullback-Leibler divergence,
also known as “relative entropy”. Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence is one of the fun-
damental concepts in statistics and information theory. From many interpretations, are
measuring goodness of fit, and measuring lose of power in a likelihood ratio test. Just
as likelihood measures how well a model explains the data, we can think of KL as
measuring the lack of fit between model and data relative to a perfect fit. Also we can
think of KL divergence from PA to Q as measuring how much power we lose with the
likelihood ratio test if we mis-specify the alternative hypothesis PA as Q.
For two measures P and Q the forward Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between
P and Q is defined to be
K(P,Q) =
Z
log dPdQdP (2.2.23)
when the state space,Ω, is discreet we can write it as
K(P,Q) = ∑
ω∈Ω
P(ω) log P(ω)Q(ω) (2.2.24)
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The empirical likelihood minimizes the forward KL divergence between the empirical
measure µn and the measure obtained by enforcing the moment condition. Let’s
P (θ) =
{
P ∈ M
∣∣∣
Z
g(x,θ)dP = 0
}
(2.2.25)
where M is the set of all probability measures on RP and define
P =
[
θ∈Θ
P (θ) (2.2.26)
then
inf
θ∈Θ
inf
P∈P (θ)
K(µn,P) = inf
P∈P
K(µn,P) (2.2.27)
If pˆ(w) = (pˆ1(w), . . . , pˆn(w)) ∈ ˆP then
K(µn, p(w)) =
n
∑
i=1
−1
n
lognpi(w) (2.2.28)
now we are in a position to present an example of how the modulation method works.
In the following example, we construct an estimator for θ and then definition 6, defines
it as an special case of the general method we introduced earlier.
Example 1:
Let the data set Xn = {x1, . . . ,xn} satisfy the moment condition
E[g(xi,θ] = 0 (2.2.29)
setting up the EL estimation for θ, using the modulator λ = (λ1, . . . ,λn), yield the
following empirical measure ˆP = (pˆ1, . . . , pˆn) such that
pˆi(θ,λ) =
1
n(1+ γˆ(θ,λ)′g(xi,θ)λi)
(2.2.30)
and
γˆ(θ) = argmin
γ∈Rp
−
n
∑
i=1
log(1+ γ′g(xi,θ)λi) (2.2.31)
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Let λ∗ be the solution to the following maximization problem
λ∗(θ) = argmax
λ∈Rn
n
∑
i=1
pˆi(θ,λ) log(pˆi(θ,λ)) (2.2.32)
the desired estimator for θ is
ˆθ∗ = argmax
θ∈Θ
−
n
∑
i=1
log pˆi(θ,λ∗(θ)) (2.2.33)
Using the framework developed in definition 2, we pick the vector λ∗ in order to
maximize K(p(λ),µn).
Definition 9:
Let
w∗ = argmax
w1,...,wn
n
∑
i=1
pi(w) log pi(w) (2.2.34)
we call the corresponding ˆθ(w∗) the KL-adapted empirical likelihood estimation of the
parameter, θ0.
This estimator has the special property that its implied probability distribution is
the maximum entropy distribution and at the same time it maximizes the empirical
likelihood too.3 The following proposition shows that the implied probabilities for
KL-adapted-EL are indeed better than those of EL estimator, as long as the KL criteria
concerns.
Proposition 5:
If pˆ = (pˆ1, . . . , pˆn) be the implied empirical probability measure of EL and pˆw∗ =
(pˆ1w∗, . . . , pˆnw∗) be the implied empirical probability measure of KL-adapted-EL then
K(µn, pˆw∗)≤ K(µn, pˆ) (2.2.35)
3According to the maximum entropy principal, the least biased distribution that encodes certain given
information, is the one which maximizes the information entropy
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Proof. pˆw∗ minimizes K(µn, p) for all pˆ ∈ P(w), if w0 = (1,1, . . . ,1) then pˆw0 = pˆ, the
implied probabilities obtained from empirical likelihood estimation, therefore we have
min
w∈W
K(µn, pˆw)≤ K(µn pˆw0) (2.2.36)
The left hand side is K(µn, pˆw∗), and the right hand side is K(µn, pˆ), therefore
K(µn, pˆw∗)≤ K(µn, pˆ) (2.2.37)
An interesting exercise is, to compare θael and θetel . θetel is designed to take ad-
vantage of both empirical likelihood, maximized empirical likelihood ratio, and expo-
nentially tilted empirical likelihood, maximized entropy. As we will see, while it does
it to some extend, (Schennach 2007), it does not produce an empirical measure that has
the two impotent property to see this let define θetel as it is done in Schennach paper.
Using minimum empirical discrepancy, (MED) (Corcoran, 1998; Cressie and Read,
1984) we have
ˆθetel = argminθ ∑i
˜h(pˆi(θ)) (2.2.38)
where pˆi(θ) is the solution to
min
{pi}ni=1
∑
i
h(pi) (2.2.39)
subject to
∑
i
pig(xi,θ) = 0 and ∑
i
pi = 1 (2.2.40)
so that
˜h(pi) =− log(pi) and h(pi) = pi log(pi) (2.2.41)
to ease comparison, we can re-define the estimator of example 1 as
ˆθ(w) = argmin
θ∈Θ
∑
i
wih(pˆi(θ,w)) (2.2.42)
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where pˆi(θ,w) is the solution to
min
{pi}ni=1
∑
i
wih(pi) (2.2.43)
subject to
∑
i
pig(xi,θ) = 0 and ∑
i
pi = 0 (2.2.44)
in this way we obtain
ˆΘ = {ˆθ(w)|w ∈W} (2.2.45)
and
ˆP = {pˆ(w) = pˆ(ˆθ(w),w)|w ∈W} (2.2.46)
if we define wp = (−p1, . . . ,−pn) then
ˆθael(wp) = ˆθetel (2.2.47)
this implies that ˆθetel ∈ ˆP and therefore
K(µn, pˆael)≤ K(µn, pˆetel) (2.2.48)
at least in theory we get an improvement upon θetel .
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2.2.4 Minimum Risk Criteria
In the previous subsection, we tried to pick the best empirical measure, pˆ, in the set
ˆP. Here in this subsection, we try to define a criteria which helps us pick the best
estimator for the unknown parameter ˆθ. The very large literature in statistical theory
which deals with this problem is commonly know as “statistical decision theory”.4
Here, we give a very short overview in hope to further facilitate the understanding
of this paper. Let A be the set of allowable decisions, usually is called the action space,
and Θ is the parameter space characterizing the set of models under consideration.
A loss function L(θ,a), a ∈ A and θ ∈ Θ, gives the loss or dis-utility suffered from
taking action a when the parameter is θ. In the context of point estimation the set A
represents the set of all relevant estimators, and therefore L(θ,a) measures the loss
incurred when the true parameter is θ and a(x1, . . . ,xn) is chosen as an estimator of
θ, when the observation of the random variable X is X = (x1, . . . ,xn). The risk, or
expected loss, of a decision rule a under θ is defined as
R(θ,a) = Eθ[L(θ,a(X))]. (2.2.49)
An example of a loss function is the squared error loss, L(θ,a) = (a− θ)2, the risk
associated with this loss function is the famous Mean Squared Error, (MSE), criterion.
Since the value of the true parameter, θ, is not known we might like to use an estimator
that has a small risk, R(θ,a), for all possible values of θ. Therefore we expect between
two estimators a1 and a2, if R(θ,a1)≤ R(θ,a2) for all θ ∈Θ and inequality is strict for
some θ then estimator a1 is preferred to the estimator a2.
4For a introductory treatment of decision theory see “Theory of Point Estimation” by E.L. Lehmann
and G. Casella 1998. A more advanced treatment can be found in “Statistical Decision Theory” by S.
French and D.R. Insua. For a survey of applications of decision theory in econometrics see “Decision
Theory in Econometrics” K. Hirano 2006. Also, “Econometrics and Decision Theory” by Chamberlian
2000
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While it seems promising, but except in some very special, and mostly linear,
cases it is almost impossible to estimate the risk function. While more studies need
to be done to distinguish the appropriate risk functions and ways to estimate them, we
still can find other criteria to choose the best estimator. An example is the empirical
Bayes implementation.5
Suppose, we have a prior belief that θ0 ∼N(θ∗,σ2I). For any given a > 0 the prob-
ability that θ0 ∈ (θ−a,θ +a) is the greatest, when θ = θ∗. Therefore, intuitively, we
want our estimator be as close as possible to θ∗. Let’s call this property, the “interval
property”. The following estimator achieves this goal.
Definition 10:
Let
λ∗ = argmin
λ∈Λ
||ˆθ(λ)−θ∗|| (2.2.50)
which Λ is the set of allowable modulators. Estimator ˆθ(λ∗), is the estimator with best
interval property.
2.3 GENERALIZED LINEAR MODEL (GML) AS AN EXAMPLE
In this subsection we try to apply the previous results and derive the optimal weights
for a generalized linear model. This class of models include the famous frameworks
like log-linear models, logit models, probit models, and many more. For an in depth
review of GLM and its applications see McCullagh and Nedler (1990) and James Lind-
sey (1997). This example is derived from Chen and Cui (2003). Here we, briefly,
5For more information about empirical Bayes inference and its applications, including economics
applications like “revenue sharing”, “insurance rate and risk evaluation” and other applications, see
Morris 1983 and references therein.
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introduce the general framework of GLMs.
Suppose data (Y1,X1), . . . ,(Yn,Xn) are observed, where Yi ∈R independent random
variables and Xi ∈ Rp, random variable Y is the response of the random vector X , a
GLM specification is the model with following representation
E[Y |X ] = G(X ′β) and Var[Y |X ] = σ2V [G(X ′β)] (2.3.1)
where β ∈ Rp is a vector of parameters, G is a known smooth link function and V is a
known variance function. The standard estimation tool in this framework, is the quasi-
likelihood (Wedderburn 1974). Let µ(β) = G(X ′β), the log quasi-likelihood ratio of β
is defined as
Q{y;µ(β)}=
Z µ(β)
y
y−u
V (u)
du (2.3.2)
Now suppose that (x1,y1), . . . ,(xn,yn) be an i.i.d data set and µi(β) = G(X ′i β). The
joint quasi-likelihood ratio of the data is
Q(µ,Y) =
n
∑
i=1
Q(Yi,µi(β)) (2.3.3)
differentiating with respect to β and doing some algebra, the quasi-score function can
be written as
∂
∂βQ(µi,Yi) =
Yi−µi
V [(µi(β))]
∂µi
∂β (2.3.4)
since E[ ∂∂βQ(µ,Y)] = 0, we have
n
∑
i=1
(Yi−µi(β))G′(X ′i β)Xi
V [(µi(β))] = 0 (2.3.5)
the same but more demanding argument will show that6
n
∑
i=1
((Yi−G(X ′i β))2
σ4V [(X ′i β)]
− 1
σ2
)
= 0 (2.3.6)
6For a complete derivation see Eric D. Kolaczyk 1994.
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To use empirical likelihood we need moment conditions which these two equations
can provide it for us. For i = 1, . . . ,n, define
g1i (β) = (Yi−µi(β))G
′(X ′i β)Xi
V [(µi(β))] (2.3.7)
and
g2i (β,σ2) =
((Yi−G(X ′i β))2
σ4V [(X ′i β)]
− 1
σ2
)
(2.3.8)
remembering definition 3, let gi(β,σ2) = (g1i ,g2i ), h1i = (g1i ,g2i ), h2i = g2i and hi =
(h1i ,h2i ), now we can define the adapted empirical likelihood for the pair (β,σ2), given
the modulator w = (w1, . . . ,wn)
L(β,σ2) = max
{pi}ni=1
n
∑
i=1
log pi (2.3.9)
subject to
n
∑
i=1
pi(h1i +h2i wi) = 0 and
n
∑
i=1
pi = 1. (2.3.10)
The common method to estimate β is to use quasi-likelihood (QL) estimators, MacCul-
lagh and Nedler (1990). It is easy to set up the EL procedure for this problem, because
the number constrain is equal to the number of equations. In this case we get pi = 1/n
and the estimator is the same as QL estimator. If we use the procedure introduced in
definition 3 we can obtain an estimator which has better variance than QL estimator.
Let ˆβql be the estimator obtained by using QL method, and ˆβ(w) is the estimator
obtained by the method introduced in this paper for a given w.7 As we discussed
earlier in this paper, we need a criteria in order to choose the best modulator w. Here
we compare the variance of ˆβ(w) to the variance of ˆβql. We try to find a w∗ such that
∀w Σ
ˆβql −Σ ˆβ(w) ≤ Σ ˆβql −Σ ˆβ(w∗) (2.3.11)
7Here we keep the two original constrains and add a weighted version of the constrain related to the
variance. As we will see this help us to use the data more efficiently, and results in an estimator with
reduced variance.
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In the other words, we choose w so that Σ
ˆβql −Σ ˆβ(w) is maximized.
Remark: For two positive semi definite matrices, A and B, we say A > B if A−B is a
positive semi-definite matrix (see “Mathematics for Econometrics” by P. Dhrymes for
further discussion).
The following result establishes the desired modulator, or weights depending on
the interpretation we might have.
Assumptions:
The following assumptions, which are standard in GLM estimation, are required in the
proof of proposition 2
A1: G(.) is twice continuously differentiable, and V (.) is continuously differentiable.
A2: E[Z1(β,σ2)Z′1(β,σ2)] is non-singular.
A3: For some δ > 0, E[|ε|2 + ||X ||]2+δ < ∞, E[|G′(X ′β)|+V−1 + w]2+δ < ∞ and
E[|G′′(X ′β)|+ |V ′|]1+δ < ∞.
A4: The matrix
(
E[∂Z1(β,σ
2)
∂β ],E[
∂Z1(β,σ2)
∂σ2 ]
)
has full rank.
Proposition 6:
If E[ε3|X ] = 0, E[ε4|X ] = κσ4V 2 for some κ > 1 and Cov(V ′GXV ) > 0, then the optimal
weights so that maximize Σ
ˆβql −Σ ˆβ(w) is
w∗(X ′β,X) = w∗i = V
′[G(X ′i β)]G′(X ′i β)Xi
V [G(X ′i β)]
(2.3.12)
Notice that, V ′ and G′ are the first order derivatives for V and G, and X ′i is the
matrix transpose of Xi.
Proof. See the appendix.
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2.4 IMPLEMENTATION AND MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
In this section, to evaluate the methods developed in the previous parts, we design
and preform sets of Monte Carlo simulations. At the moment, from five simulation
problems, which I am working on, I will only report two of them. This is both for
keeping this paper in an acceptable size range, and some technical difficulties with
some of the other simulations. Therefore, I consider this part as an incomplete section,
and I am working to complete it by designing viable algorithms. The main compu-
tational problem is optimization with respect to the modulators. The lack of closed
from solution in most cases, makes this optimization a very computationally intensive
procedure. Although this is a very big draw back, but one can argue that the modula-
tion, or weighting, has better efficiency than the unweighted EL only when the sample
size is small. Therefore there is not much gain from applying the method of weight-
ing when the sample size is large, because both methods are asymptotically equivalent.
Therefore, the hope is that, when the sample size is small the optimization with respect
to the modulation would work. In this section, I present the result obtained from two
simulations.
2.4.1 GLM Estimation
Here we report some simulation results, using the GLM model
Yi = G(X ′i β)+σV
(
G(X ′iβ))εi (2.4.1)
where εi ∼ N(0,1), V (t) = t, and G(t) = log(X ′i β). The parameters used in this model
are β1 = 0.5, β2 = 1, and σ2 = 0.25. Xi = (Xi1,Xi2)′ are generated from uniform distri-
bution on [0 2]× [0 2]. I have used the quasi-likelihood procedure of R, which is the
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main tool of estimating GLM models in R, to obtain (βql,σql). To derive the weighted
EL estimation we use the usual empirical likelihood procedure augmented with the
optimal weights obtained from proposition 2. Table 1 summarizes the quasi-likelihood
estimation results, and table 2 summarizes the results obtained from weighted EL. As
these results suggest there is a sensible improvement, though small, in the variance of
WEL estimator compared with QL estimator, and very important, this improvement
comes at no cost in bias.
Table 4: Standard Error(SD) and Bias of the QL Estimator
ˆβ1 ˆβ2 σˆ
Sample Size SD Bias SD Bias SD Bias
40 0.41 0.053 0.49 0.057 0.10 0.0041
60 0.38 0.032 0.45 0.039 0.086 0.0035
100 0.32 0.025 0.35 0.028 0.051 0.0020
200 0.24 0.013 0.24 0.010 0.035 0.0010
2.4.2 Heteroskedastic Data
The data set, (Yi,Xi), for this experiment is generated from
Yi = β1Xi +β2X2i + |Xi|1/2εi. (2.4.2)
where εi ∼ N(0,1), drawn i.i.d. To generate X , we draw Xi from the N(1,1) distribu-
tion. The moment condition is E[g(β1,β2,Xi)] = 0 where
g(β1,β2,Xi) = Yi−β1Xi +β2X
2
i
|Xi|1/2
. (2.4.3)
53
Table 5: Standard Error(SD) and Bias of the WQL Estimator
ˆβ1 ˆβ2 σˆ
Sample Size SD Bias SD Bias SD Bias
40 0.38 0.046 0.44 0.054 0.095 0.0045
60 0.35 0.030 0.41 0.037 0.085 0.0036
100 0.30 0.025 0.34 0.028 0.051 0.0021
200 0.23 0.013 0.23 0.010 0.035 0.0010
We obtain the empirical likelihood estimate of two parameters β1 and β2. We compare
these estimates with an estimator in which the weighting vector w = (w1, . . . ,wn) with
wi = 1/|Xi|, is used alongside the empirical likelihood estimate, as it was describe in
section 2. These weights are driven from the same argument as optimum weight are
obtained in GLE, the information coming from densities with higher variances should
weighted less compare to information coming from densities with lower variances.
This was we avoid optimizing the objective function with respect to the weighting
vector. The results indicate that, when the sample size is small, the weighting helps to
improve both the quality of the estimator in one hand and the tests biased on weighted
EL ratio are more reliable than tests based on the usual EL ratios. Table one compares
the bias property of the two estimator and in table two we compare the tests based on
EL ratio and weighted EL ratio. As we expect the importance of weighting drops as
the sample size grows.
Table 2 summarizes the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 : β1 = 1 and
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Table 6: Bias comparison of the EL and EL using Weights
Estimated bias for ˆβ1 in % Estimated bias for ˆβ2 in %
Sample Size EL Method W-EL Method EL Method W-EL Method
10 56.0 51.8 48.2 41.9
20 41.7 35.4 39.0 37.4
50 26.4 25.6 21.2 20.8
100 18.6 18.2 14.0 14.0
H0 : β2 = 1 at the normal 95% confidence level. It is interesting to see that, when in
computing empirical likelihood ratio, heteroskedasticity is accounted for, test statistics
are more reliable.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
This, and a companion paper (Shahidi 2008), investigate the use of shrinkage meth-
ods in empirical likelihood framework. We introduce two of the most widely used of
these methods, adaptation and penalization, and then extend the empirical likelihood
procedure to encompass these methods. Shrinkage methods not only help to improve
the EL estimator, but also can be used to regularize some ill-posed inference problems.
We define modulation and use it to construct adapted empirical likelihood procedure.
This estimator can be regarded as a weighting method which weight the data points ac-
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Table 7: Bias comparison of the EL and EL using Weights
Probability of rejecting β1 = 1 Probability of rejecting β2 = 1
Sample Size EL Method W-EL Method EL Method W-EL Method
10 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.06
20 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06
50 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
100 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
cording to their importance. We see that this is a very useful tool when we are dealing
with a small sample heteroskedastic data set. simulation results confirm the superior-
ity of our proposed estimator to the plain empirical likelihood estimator. Also, in the
presence of heteroskedasticity, specially in small samples, the test statistics based on
adapted empirical likelihood ratios are more reliable than their EL ratio counterparts.
While modulation method in theory improves the empirical likelihood estimator,
the computation difficulties limit its usefulness to very special cases. We have studied
the modulation method in a generalized linear model framework, in which the Monte
Carlo simulations suggest promising results. For future studies, I plan to develop and
design more efficient algorithms to implement the estimators introduced in this paper.
Another area which needs more study, is the risk function estimation. Choosing and
estimating an appropriate risk function is the subject of statistical decision theory, and
is usually a hard problem. Choosing and estimating an appropriate risk function is the
key to practical use of some of the results presented in this paper.
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3.0 CELEBRITY EFFECTS: HOW FAMOUS TRADERS IMPACT THE
FINANCIAL MARKET
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The actions and opinions of celebrities in particular, and public opinion leaders in
general, have a special effect on their fans and on the society they live in. Indeed,
attempts have been made to benefit from the popularity of these celebrities. These
days we see more and more celebrities becoming candidates for political offices, while
many politicians try to get endorsement from athletes and other kinds of celebrities.
For example, It is now acceptable for a serious candidate for a high electoral office to
submit to interviews by celebrities such as David Letterman, Jay Leno, and Jon Stewart
on their daily late night talk shows.
At the same time celebrities are becoming more aware of the power they have and
try to use it more often. Actors and musicians, in increasing numbers, are endorsing
and campaigning for candidates and making political statements with the obvious goal
of influencing the opinions and the behavior of their fans. To mention but a few, we
can name the U.N. celebrity diplomacy, and Bono’s involvement in raising aid money
for poverty reduction and health care initiatives in Africa and so on. In a nutshell,
all of these increased activities by celebrities and their fans in political and public life
suggest that celebrity endorsements have the ability to make certain statements more
57
palatable while increasing the level of agreement for already popular opinions.1
Aside from the realm of politics and public opinion, celebrity endorsement is a big
business in the marketing industry. Advertisement campaigns have been paying great
sums of money to celebrities to endorse, or even just to use, their products. The best
sign that these kinds of endorsements are beneficial is the amount of money that com-
panies spend on celebrity endorsement, a practice that shows no sign of slowing down.
For instance, in Forbes magazine’s (2004) lists of the top 100 celebrities Golfer Tiger
Woods, ranks number 3 and has a $105 million dollar contract with Nike. “Several
studies have examined consumers response to celebrity endorsements in advertising,
findings show that celebrities make advertising believable.” (Jagdish & Wagner 1995)
and “advertising uses celebrities as pioneers in order to dictate trends”. Also, studies
have shown positive relationships between the stock price and the usage of celebrity
endorsement in the advertising strategies of a company.2
One of the questions which I try to answer in this paper is the effect of imitation
in financial markets. In other words, is the price mechanism in stock and other finan-
cial markets able to convey information efficiently in such a way that diminishes the
celebrity status of famous traders? Numerous cases can be mentioned as evidence that
prices lack such ability. For example on Wednesday September 16, 1992, a day that
is remembered as Black Wednesday, George Soros almost single-handedly forced the
British government of the day to abandon the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.
Besides yielding him almost one billion US dollars, this incident hugely enhanced his
1Another example of the effect that celebrities’ actions and behaviors can have on the society they
live, even when there is no intention of having that effect, is the former first lady Nancy Reagan’s mas-
tectomy, instead of breast-conserving surgery in October 1987.Studies show that compared to women
undergoing surgery for breast cancer in the third quarter of 1987-just prior to the Mrs. Reagan’s surgery-
wo men were 25 percent less likely to undergo BCS in the fourth quarter of 1987 and first quarter of
1988. In subsequent quarters the rate returns to the base line. (JAMA 1998)
2For example see “Srivastava et al” Journal of Marketing 1998 and the references therein.
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reputation too, so that in April 1993, when he bought around 3 million ounces of gold
at $ 345 per ounce and invested $ 400 million in Newmont Mining-a gold mining
company, as soon as the traders learned of Soros’ purchase, gold rose $ 5 after a long
period of decline, a trend that continued to 1996 and lifted the price of gold to $ 405.
His investment in British real estate, which subsequently skyrocketed the price of real
estate, and the Malaysian prime minister’s accusation that Gorge Soros has ruined the
East Asian economies-in reference to the 1997 crisis in East Asia - are other exam-
ples of how much influence a single trader can have on other traders’ behavior and
subsequently the market as a whole.
More recently, after the market crash of 2000, the United States Congress held
hearings entitled “Analyzing the Analyst” aimed at addressing stock analysts and their
recommendations, suggesting that words and recommendations can have a huge im-
pact on the behavior of other participants. Also in 2002 the NYSE and NASDAQ
issued new regulations, which were primarily aimed at the top ten investment banks,
usually called big tens, to curb the conflicting interests on the analysis and recommen-
dations issued by the big banks and famous analysts. Some even suggested that there
has been a conspiracy to push the market up by frequently issuing very positive rec-
ommendations. Titles like “Wall Street treachery: leading the lambs to the slaughter”
or “The betrayed investors: American bought to the idea that stocks would only make
them richer” (both from Business Week) suggest a more intentional misleading.
The question we intend to ask and try to answer in this paper is: what mecha-
nism causes the agents acting in an economical environment to follow the “popular
figures”? The argument made by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al (1992), from
now on BHW, shows that herding is not necessarily an irrational phenomenon. These
papers argue that, if people act in sequence and observe the actions of their prede-
cessors without accessing the actual information received by them, the information
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contained in the history of actions eventually will overwhelm the private information
of every agent forcing them to abandon their own private information and follow the
actions of their predecessors. BHW also argue that their model can be a base for un-
derstanding the uniformity of social behaviors and the creation of norms and fashions.
Avery and Zemsky (1998) have shown that while it might be the case when the cost of
choosing different actions is fixed, the argument breaks down in the presence of an ad-
justable price. Therefore the price mechanism in financial markets will adjust in such
a way that every participant will be better off following his own private signal. They
show that in order for herding to happen we need what they call multidimensional
uncertainty.
While Avery & Zemsky (1998) suggest that informational herding is a very rare
phenomenon, other sources of herd behavior might still exist. There is a large literature
in reputation-based herding. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Trumen (1994), Zweibel
(1995), Graham (1999) and others provide another theory of herding in financial mar-
ket based on the reputational concerns of fund managers or analysts.3
In this study, I will try to expand the BHW model based on the central idea that not
all agents in an economic or social environment carry the same weight when it comes
to influencing other peoples’ actions. Although some agents have the ability to reach
out to a larger portion of the population, and their actions are highly influential, there
are other agents-the majority of agents-where their actions go largely unnoticed and
they don’t have any influence on other’s opinion and actions.
The contribution of this paper is two fold. First, I extend the BWH model to
include agents with “celebrity status”, providing a potential framework to study and
design different advertising policies. Using this framework, we can better understand
3For a survey of herding in financial market see “Herd Behavior in Financial Markets” by Bikhchan-
dani and Sharma.
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the disproportional effects of celebrities statements, and the ability of famous traders in
financial and other markets to influence market activities. I believe there is a large host
of social, political, and economical phenomena which fit in this framework. Therefore,
our model in this paper, can be a good starting point to study these phenomena. The
second contribution is providing a framework to help understand how some bubbles
form and burst, and what role major traders have in creating them.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we construct a model
to incorporate the notion of celebrity or what we will call “The Star” agent. There, we
study the model and its implications. In section 3, as an example, we study a model
of the stock market in which there is a star trader. This model will be similar to the
model used by Avery-Zemsky (1998). The main difference is that, we use the model
of herding developed in this paper instead of BHW. Also, in section 3, we will show
that the star trader has a limited ability to pull the market in her/his direction. Section
4 concludes the paper. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
3.2 THE MODEL
In this paper, we assume that an individual can only see the actions of his or her pre-
decessors. The crucial point here is that the agents cannot observe the actual signals of
their predecessors. If they were able to do so, then the pieces of information available
to individuals would effectively aggregate and talking about the effect of somebody’s
action on somebody else’s behavior wouldn’t make much sense. Because agents can’t
observe their predecessor’s signals, it is possible that they believe some of their prede-
cessors had access to better information. This helps towards the rise of some of those
predecessors to the “star” status.
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3.2.1 A Simple Model
1. There is a sequence of exogenously ordered individuals, each deciding to adopt
or reject some action based on the information they have, and in order to maxi-
mize their value. If the information they have cannot distinguish between the two
alternatives, they chose to adopt with probability 1/2.
2. Each individual observes the decisions of all those ahead of him.
3. All individuals have the same cost of adopting, c. For simplicity, we assume c =
1/2. The gain of adopting, V, is also the same for everyone. Again, for simplicity,
we assume V is 0 or 1 with equal probability.
4. Each individual privately observes a conditionally independent signal about the
true value, V. Each individual i’s signal is either H or L. H is observed with prob-
ability pi > 1/2 if the true value is 1 and, likewise, L is observed with probability
pi > 1/2 if the true value is zero. Again, for simplicity we assume that
pi = p, ∀i. (3.2.1)
5. There is a special individual, whom we call “star”, such that when he acts a por-
tion of other agents, who are distributed randomly between the whole population
of agents, will view his decision as more informative than the decisions of other
agents, including their own signal. This randomly distributed part of the popula-
tion who consider the actions of the star to be more informative, or in fact more
influentially, are called “fans”.4
4We notice that there is no assumption indicating that the “star” has indeed access to better infor-
mation nor that his signal is more accurate than others. Although it might be the case in the real world
that famous people have such information, fans, anyway, frequently put too much weight on the star’s
actions. This model can be considered an attempt to capture such over reactions by the fans.
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6. To clearly define the difference between fans and non-fans we have to consider two
different probability measures according to which they associate different proba-
bilities to the same event. Suppose that the “star” appears at time t; if a fan acts at
time t +1 he assigns
Pf (V = 1) = pi∗, (3.2.2)
as the probability while if a non-fan acts at the time t +1 he assigns
Pn f (V = 1) = pi (3.2.3)
such that pi∗ > pi.
If Ht is the history of actions up until time t, and h∗t is the piece of information at
time t capturing the star’s action, we can interpret pi∗t and pit as Pf (V = 1|Ht−1,h∗t )
and Pn f (V = 1|Ht).5 For further simplicity, we assume that the “star” enters at
t = 0 and therefore we set t = 0 to obtain
Pf (V = 1) = pi∗ and Pn f (V = 1) = pi, (3.2.4)
such that pi∗ > pi, right after the star’s entry.6
7. We assume that the population of agents is a continuum and every agent has a la-
bel in [0,1]. A portion of this population accounts for the fans and the set of labels
corresponding to fans is of measure µ. To choose an agent at time t, a random
number, r, will be chosen from a uniform distribution on [0,1]. If r < µ, then a fan
is chosen, otherwise a non-fan. The law of large numbers guarantees that in each
date, t, the probability that a fan is chosen is µ.
5 Note that for the non-fan we have Ht = {Ht−1,h∗t }. However, this doesn’t hold for the fans’
information sets.
6With this assumption pi is the signal accuracy p, and we can calculate Pf (V = 1|H∗t ) and Pn f (V =
1|Ht) for every subsequent t using Bayes’ rule.
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Note: We assume that the agents don’t take into account the presence of the other
fans. If they were to do so, it will make the inferences intractable.
3.2.2 Some Observations:
In this subsection I mention some of the results that can be derived from the model
which was introduced above.
First, we define a naive fan:
Definition 11:
A naive fan is a fan who thinks every other fan is following her/his own signal. In
other words, a naive fan doesn’t take to consideration the possibility that previous
agents might be herding. When we talk about fans we mean this naive kind of fans
except if we state it otherwise.
Second, using Bayes’ rule we define the belief update operator f by
f (x) = (1− p)x
(1− p)x+ p(1− x) , (3.2.5)
and define n to be
n = min{m| f m(pi)≤1/2} (3.2.6)
. As proposition 1 will show, this number will help us to transfer a fan’s belief in a star
to the number of signals opposing the star’s choice that are needed in order for this fan
to “abandon the star”. Note that 0 < pi < 1 and f k(x) is a k times composition of f
with itself. In the following lemma we show that n indeed exists and is finite. We will
also explore some properties of f that will be used later in this paper.
Lemma 3:
For any 0 < pi < 1, n exists and is finite. Furthermore n increases with an increase in
pi.
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Proof. see the appendix.
When is a fan ready to abandon the star and instead, use his own information?
A fan who favors the star would like to follow her, but if he keeps getting signals
indicating that others are receiving information suggesting the star is wrong, the fan
will reach a point in which he finds the accumulated evidence compelling enough to
abandon the star and choose a different action instead. The following result, which can
be proven using lemma 1 formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 7:
Define n∗ to be
n∗ = min{m| f m(pi∗0)≤ 1/2}.
At least n∗ consecutive opposing actions to the star’s action are needed for a fan to
abandon the star.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that the star acts at t = 0 and, therefore,
Pf (V = 1|H0) = pi∗. If the fan receives a negative signal then he will update his beliefs
to
Pf (V = 1|h∗,x = 0) = (1− p)pi
∗
(1− p)pi∗+ p(1−pi∗) = f (pi
∗). (3.2.7)
In addition,
Pf (V = 1|h∗,x1 = 0,x2 = 0, . . .xn = 0) = (3.2.8)
Pf ((V = 1|h∗,x1 = 0,x2 = 0, . . .xn−1 = 0),xn = 0)
= f ( f n−1(pi∗)).
We also have E f [V |Ht] = Pf (V = 1|Ht). Thus, the fan follows the star as long as
Pf (V = 1|Ht) > 1/2. This implies that a fan abandons the star if
Pf (V = 1|Ht) = f n(pi∗) < 1/2.
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When f n(pi∗) = 1/2, the fan abandons the star with probability 1/2.
Using proposition 1 we can construct a simple optimal decision rule. This decision
rule is the basis for proposition 2, which greatly enhances our understanding of this
model and simplifies the calculations.
Let a be the number of predecessors who have adopted and r the number of those
predecessors who have rejected and set d = a− r. We have the following optimal
decision rule for a fan:
If n is the number obtained from proposition 1, the star has adopted, and d > −n
then a fan should adopt regardless of his private signal. If d =−n, the fan should adopt
if the private signal is high and otherwise reject with probability 1/2. If d < −n, the
fan should reject regardless of his private signal. Similarly, for a non-fan we have the
following rule. If d > 1, the non-fan should adopt regardless of his private signal. If
d = 1, the agent should adopt if the private signal is high and reject with probability
1/2 if the private signal is low. If d < 1, should reject regardless of his private signal.
If we define sn to be the state in which d = n and let S to be the set of all such sn
we have the following proposition:
Proposition 8:
The subsequent actions of the agents entering after “a star” form a Markov chain
which has only two absorbing states : (a) A cascade in the direction of the star’s
choice. (b) A cascade in the opposite direction of the star’s choice.
Proof. See the appendix for a proof.
Example 2:
Consider the simplest case in which there is no star in the model, (this is the original
model studied in BHW). In this model we have 5 different states. Two of them are
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absorbing sates and, therefore, (from Markov chain theory) the process will eventually
absorb to one of these states as the number of agents goes to infinity. Here p = pi∗,
which implies:
f (pi∗) = (1− p)pi
∗
(1− p)pi∗+ p(1−pi∗) = 1/2.
Therefore,
n = min{m| f m(pi∗)≤ 1/2}= 1
and
S = {s1 =−2,s2 =−1,s3 = 0,s4 = 1,s5 = 2}.
The following figure shows the Markov diagram of the resulting Markov chain.
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Example 3:
Now suppose that there is a star in the model who acts in time t = 0 and chooses to
adopt. Suppose the fans’ initial faith on the star is pi∗ = 0.60, and the signal accuracy
is p = 0.56. We have:
f (pi∗) = 0.541 and f 2(pi∗) = f (0.541) = .480 < 1/2.
Hence,
n = min{m| f m(pi∗)≤ 1/2}= 2,
and
S = {s1 =−3,s2 =−2,s3 =−1,s4 = 0,s5 = 1,s6 = 2}.
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We, thus, have a Markov chain with 6 different states. Again, this process has two
absorbing states, although the probability of being absorbed to the cascade in the
direction of the star’s choice (state s6 = 2) is much greater than the probability of being
absorbed to the cascade in the opposite direction of the star’s choice (state s1 = −3).
The following figure shows the Markov diagram associated with this Markov chain:
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3.2.3 Fragility:
In a model without stars any kind of cascade is very fragile. Indeed, when participants
in such an environment find themselves in a cascade, they can realize that the cascade
is based on little information. For example, in an up cascade, where everybody adopts,
they know for sure that the first person had a high signal and there is a probability of
1/2 that the second actor also have had a high signal. Now if one agent gets a low
signal plus another piece7of negative information, she will be in a position where her
own private signal is more informative than the information that comes from observing
their predecessors’ actions.
This fragility is somehow counter intuitive, in the sense that it suggests that after
the appearance of the first signs of a problem with an existing norm, tradition, or fash-
ion, the public will abandon it and the participants will start to use their own private
information. This is, off course, somewhat different from what we observe in reality,
7For instance suppose this particular agent gets two signals vs. others who just get one.
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where it is usually hard to break an established norm or social tradition. Some even
suggest that the biggest obstacle in some developing societies are certain existing and
traditions and convincing the members of those societies to abandon them. Although
many people in those societies understand the devastating consequences of their tra-
ditions and social norms, it is still difficult to convince the population to change their
“old ways”. This study suggests that we should at least investigate for the role of stars,
opinion leaders, and so forth, in order to understand the rigidity and of some of these
norms.
In the presence of a star, any cascade which favors her choice is not so fragile and
will resist defections, although a cascade that is not in her direction will be equally
fragile as in the model without the star. Let’s first clearly define what we mean when
we say that a cascade is broken.
Definition 12:
i) A cascade has been broken at time t if and only if the actor at time t +1 ignores the
cascade and follows her own information.
ii) A defection from a cascade at time t is successful if it breaks the cascade at time
t + k.
If we assume that after time t, which is after the emergence of a cascade in the star’s
direction, every participant receivers a signal opposing the star; then the following
proposition applies with regards to the fragility of this cascade.
Proposition 9:
Suppose that after a defection at time t, every other agent in subsequent times receives
a negative signal (a signal pointing to the opposite direction of the ongoing cascade).
The probability that the defection at time t will be successful is (1−µ)(n−1) where n is
the same as in proposition 1.
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Proof. See the appendix.
So far, we have assumed that all fans are “naive”. If we drop this assumption and
assume that fans take to account the possibility of herding by their predecessors. We
formally call this kind of agents “sophisticated” agents. The sophisticated agents
will end up following the “star” regardless of their own signal (given they have a
strong enough belief in the “star”). This is somehow counter intuitive, since more
sophisticated agents are aware of the possibility that the actions of their predecessors
might be the result of herding behavior. Still, they end up ignoring all the previous
information. Formally, we have the following:
Proposition 10:
Assume that the fans are “sophisticated” and let
n = min{m| f m(pi∗0)≤ 1/2}
and n > 2. Then, these fans always follow the “star” regardless of their own signal.
Proof. See the appendix.
3.2.4 Possible Extensions
In this subsection I discuss possible extensions of the model we just introduced. The
main intuition in the previous model was the fact that not all individuals are equally
important, but rather special individuals exist, who have the power to influence others.
We can extend this intuition by asking “Is it possible that the actions of all individuals
are equally visible by all other participants.” I believe the answer to this question is
no. In most real world cases, not only are the individuals different in their ability to
influence other people’s decisions and actions, but also they are different in their ability
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to reach out to other people. For example, a decision, opinion or action by somebody
like myself will most likely go unnoticed by the majority of the population, while
actions, opinions or decisions by, say Tom Hanks can catch the eyes of the world. To
this end, we can define a network of connections, in the sense that a → b means that
“b will notice a”, but not vise versa. A natural definition of a star in this framework is
as the agent who can be observed by every (or a large portion) of the other agents.
Other possibilities like a system with two or more stars or even opposing stars can
be exploited as well. What is the dynamic of behaviors in a polarized society in which
two opposing stars have their fans and “anti-fans” and what role do the independents
play in such a society? I will not study these issues here. However, in the next sec-
tion I will use a very simple network to study the mis-pricing of a stock in a simple
financial market. I will show that, under special circumstances, mispricing and bub-
bles can occur. Furthermore, rational traders won’t be able to realize or correct such
phenomena.
3.3 AN EXAMPLE: FINANCIAL MARKETS
In this section we study a simple market with one asset. We will see that when there
are enough traders, like individual investors who don’t necessarily have much skills
or knowledge about the market, who are ready to trust the star investors and follow
them, two different probability measures will emerge which deter the ability of prices
to convey information efficiently to prevent bubbles.
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3.3.1 Stating the problem
Although rational approaches to asset pricing have been considerably successful, it is
hard to believe that imitative behavior in such markets are totally erased. In fact, there
has been a resurgence of interest in the study of such behavior in recent years, with
behavioral finance gaining popularity. In this section we first illustrate the idea using
an example derived in part from Avery-Zemsky. First, I will show why in a BHW
framework, rationality prevents herd behavior. I will then use the framework built in
section 2 of this paper to investigate a market in which there is a star investor who
is noticed by everyone, and where the normal investors (non stars) believe that the
information from the star investor is more accurate than their own. We will investigate
how herd behavior becomes a possibility under these conditions. Furthermore, we
believe that these conditions are not plausible. For example, there have been times
when big investment firms issued positive recommendations on stocks, thereby causing
the mass of inexperienced or even experienced investors to buy and push the price of
the stock very high. If we interpret the combination of these investment banks as “the
star investor”, we believe the model introduce in the section 2 of this paper can be used
to understand such issues.
3.3.2 A Simple Example
First, let’s review the original BHW model in light of this example. Agents face a
choice of whether or not to adopt a new technology. The cost of adoption is c = 1/2.
The value of the new technology is V , which is either 1 or 0 with equal probability.
Each agent gets an independent, but not perfect, signal abut V , denoted by x, x∈{0,1},
where P(x = V ) = p > 1/2. Agents act sequentially and observe Ht , the history of
actions up until time t. Let pit1 = P(V = 1|Ht) . The choice made by an agent depends
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on whether the expected value for adopting is greater or less than c.
The expected value of an agent with bad news at time t is:
V t(x = 0) = E[V |x = 0,Ht] = P(V = 1|x = 0,Ht) (3.3.1)
=
(1− p)pit1
(1− p)pit1 + p(1−pit1)
.
The expected value for an agent with good news at time t is:
V t(x = 1) = E[V |x = 1,Ht] = P(V = 1|x = 1,Ht) (3.3.2)
=
ppit1
ppit1 +(1− p)(1−pit1)
.
Therefore pit1 increases in the difference between the number of prior agents who
adopted and those who did not. When there are two more adopters than non-adopters
we will have pit1 > p, which implies
V t(x = 1) >V t(x = 0) > 1/2. (3.3.3)
In this situation every agent who acts at time t will adopt regardless of his signal, in
the words of BHW an informational cascade will arise.
In financial markets the price mechanism suppresses this imitative effect and pre-
vents the cascades from occurring. To see how, suppose that in the above example,
agents are traders in a financial market and their choice is whether to buy or to sell
a unit of an asset whose value is given by V. Furthermore, suppose that the financial
market is informationally efficient, which implies that the price reflects all publicly
available information (here we interpret the cost in previous examples as being the
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price of the asset). Therefore, unlike the previous case, here, the cost will adjust when
new information arrives. More precisely, we have :
cˆ = E[V |Ht ] = P(V = 1|Ht) = pit1, (3.3.4)
which implies:
V t(x = 1) > cˆ >Vt(x = 0). (3.3.5)
Therefore, an agent with good news will buy while an agent with bad news will not
adopt (in this case buy) and, thus, no herding occurs.
Now suppose a competitive group of market makers, or equivalently a market
maker who makes zero profit, determine the prices, by setting bids and asks prices
as
Bt = E[V |ht = S,Ht], (3.3.6a)
and
At = E[V |ht = B,Ht]. (3.3.6b)
Here, S stands for selling orders and B stands for buying ones. We only analyze the
buying activities (selling is similar). Therefore, we focus our attention on the prices
at which the agents are willing to buy the asset. (See Lawrence Glosten and Milgrom
(1985)). Suppose that there is a star investor such that his decisions are observed by
all other investors. There are also regular investors (non-stars) who do not observe
each others decisions. These assumption have been made to simplify the calculations
and the computer simulations we perform. We also assume that all regular investors
consider the actions of the star investor to be more informative than their own, and
that the star investor enters at the beginning. Every buyer receives a private signal
x∈{0,1}, s.t. P(x = V ) > 1/2. Suppose that the prior probability of V = {0,1} is
74
P(V = 1) = P(V = 0). Given this information, we can find the probability of the value
being equal to one if the star investor buys.
P(V = 1|hs = B) (3.3.7)
=
P(hs = B|V = 1)P(V = 1)
P(hs = B|V = 1)P(V = 1)+P(hs = B|V = 0)P(V = 0)
=
P(hs = B|V = 1)
P(hs = B|V = 0)+P(hs = B|V = 1)
= P(hs = B|V = 1) = pi1.
Here, pi1 is the probability that V = 1 if the star investor buys. We have assumed that
pi1 > p, which implies that other agents consider the star’s information more accurate.
Now, suppose that at time t = 0 the star investor buys. The market marker will set
the price for t = 1 to be
V m1 = Em[V |h0 = B] = P(V = 1|h0 = B) = p. (3.3.8)
At the same time, a fan buyer who gets a negative signal at time t = 1 will evaluate the
price as:
V A1 = E[V |hs = B,x = 0] = P(V = 1|hs = B,x = 0) (3.3.9)
=
(1− p)pi1
(1− p)pi1 + p(1−pi1) = pi2
Now, if pi2 > p, the fan investor will buy despite receiving a negative signal. The
important observation is that this situation can indeed happen. Figure 1 describes a
simulation with p = .52, pi1 = .75, and pi1 = P(V = 1|hs = B). The probability that
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the fan investor initially assigns to the event that V = 1 when he sees the action of the
star is assumed to be pi1 > p. As we see it takes a while (6 periods in this case) for the
agents with negative signals to stop buying.
To illustrate this point better we repeat the process one more period. Now suppose
that at time t = 2 the agent whose turn is to act again receives a negative signal (x = 0).
The market marker will set the price:
V m2 = E[V |h0 = B,h1 = B] =
pV m1
pV m1 +(1− p)(1−V m1 )
. (3.3.10)
While the agent’s value is:
V A2 =
(1− p)pi2
(1− p)pi2 + p(1−pi2) . (3.3.11)
Again, if V A2 >V m2 , the agent will buy even thought he has a negative signal. Thus,
herding can happen in this situation. However, it will be short lived. The important
point to notice is that the market maker and agents use two different measures for
evaluating the relevant probabilities. 8
3.3.3 A General Model
Here,we consider a more general model in which the market is for just a single asset
with true value V in such a way that V∈{0,1}. Like the example we studied above,
prices are set by a competitive market maker who interacts with an infinite sequence
of individual traders who are chosen from a continuum population. This assumption
guarantees that no trader appears in the sequence more than one time. Thus, we need
not to worry about strategic considerations. Each trader is risk neutral and has the
8We conjecture that the price that market marker sets is still a martingale with respect to the market
maker’s measure. This is intuitively obvious since if it was not a martingale, then his assessment of Vt
would be systematically mistaken in a manner which should be predictable to him.
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Figure 1: The stars show the prices as they are set by the fan agent. The circles
represent the prices set by the market maker. The horizontal axes shows the number of
periods.
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option to buy, sell, or hold onto one unit of stock. Trades occur at dates t = 0,1,2, . . . .
The publicly available information up until time t is denoted by Ht and is referred to
as “the history of trades up until time t”.
There are two classes of traders in our model. Informed traders who receive private
information and try to maximize their profit using their private, and public informa-
tion, Ht . This class divides into two subclasses. “Normal traders” who follow strict
Bayesian reasoning without putting any special weight on any particular traders, and
“fan traders” who also use Bayesian reasoning, but put more weight on the action of
a particular trader who we shall call the star trader. The second class of traders are
“noise traders” acting for liquidity considerations. 9
We let µ < 1 denotes the probability of an informed trader arriving at any given
time t. Therefore, 1−µ is the probability of a noise trader arriving. Furthermore, and
for further convenience, we assume that noise traders buy, sell, or do nothing, with
equal probability: λ = (1−µ)/3.
Finally, there is a special trader whose action is considered more informative by
some other traders. We assume that she trades at t = 0 and that the portion of traders
who “believe in her” is γ.
3.3.3.1 A Definition of Herd Behavior: We want to define herd behavior in such
a way that it rules out the situations in which everybody is buying because all have
positive signals, or everybody is selling because each trader gets a negative signal.
By “herd behavior”, we mean a situation in which everybody is ignoring his signal in
favor of public information. For instance, a trader is in the buying herd if, based on her
private information she should sell the asset, but after observing the public information
9In the absence of noise traders, the no-trade theorem of Milgrom-Stocky(1982) applies and the
market breaks down.
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Ht she decides to buy. We have the following definition.
Definition 13:
A trader with private information, x, engages in herd behavior at time t if he buys when
Vx <Vm <Vx,Ht or sells when Vx >Vm >Vx,Ht ; and buying (selling) is strictly preferred
to other actions.
3.3.4 Some Observations:
Given the model in the last section, here we investigate whether if mispricing and
bubbles can occur. To this ends we define
f (x) = px
px+(1− p)(1− x) , (3.3.12)
and
g(x) =
(1− p)x
(1− p)x+ p(1− x) . (3.3.13)
Let
n = min{m|g(pi∗)≤ f m(p)}. (3.3.14)
Then we have the following.
Proposition 11:
Let ¯β = f n(p) and β = gn(p), where n is given as above. Then, the size of any bubble
is bounded from above by
δ =| ¯β−β |
Another question that arises is that of how long it takes for the price of the asset
reach to its highest level. The next proposition attempts to answer this question.
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Proposition 12:
Let pi∗ = Pf (V = 1|H0), p = Pn f (V = 1|H0), and n taken from proposition 3. Let T
denote the time it takes for the price of the asset to reach δ. We have the following.
(a) If γ≤ 1/6+1/3µ, then Prob(T < ∞) = 1, but E[T ] = ∞.
(b) If γ < 1/6+1/3µ, then
Prob(T < ∞) = (γ−1/3µ+1/3
2/3− γ+1/3µ)
n < 1. (3.3.15)
(c) If γ > 1/6+1/3µ. then
E[T ] =
3n
6γ−2µ−1 . (3.3.16)
The difference between f (p) and g(p) in proposition 5 is not very large. This
implies that ( ¯β− β) won’t grow too large. Therefore, when pi∗ (the primary faith
of fans on the star) is not too high, the size of any bubble won’t grow very large.
Furthermore, proposition 6 suggests that it would be difficult for the price to “grow out
of control”. Additionally, when there are enough traders who don’t follow the star, it
is almost impossible to obtain a bubble in which the asset is substantially mispriced.
The only time that we can expect these kind of bubbles to appear is when fan traders
are dominating the market, so that a substantial portion of market participants are
positively biased toward the star trader.
I have simulated the model discussed in this section. Figure 1 shows a sample path
of the real price as implied by the model. We can observe from figure 2 that there
won’t be any substantial mispricing when we have enough normal traders to “time”
the market. However, as figure 3 shows, in times when the fan traders dominate the
market, 60% in this case, there is a good chances that we see bubbles particularly in bad
times when the actual price should be falling. Both in this paper and in the simulations
I have assumed that there is no changes of opinion, and that the fan traders have a fixed
biased toward the star. A good exercise would be to alter the model so that in every
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Figure 2: A sample path of the real price as implied by the model
period a participant is assigned a type which indicates whether the participant is a fan,
and if she is, how biased she is towards the star. In this case, we can study situations
in which the fan traders eventually will alert their trust on the star if the market is not
going well in the direction that the star recommends. In order to do so, we need a
model for this alternation. In other words, we need a theory that tells us how people
alter their beliefs in critical times.10
3.3.5 A Possible Extension
In the previous section, we studied a case in which the star appears once at the begin-
ning and, because some of the other agents consider her action to be more informative,
they are willing to pay more for the asset than what their own signal recommends. This
10If we just assume a random alternation of beliefs, I suspect that we won’t get substantially different
results from the simulations presented in this section.
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Figure 3: When fans are 30%, noise tarders are 10%, and normal traders are 60% of
the total market
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Figure 4: When fans are 60%, noise traders are 10%, and normal traders are 30% of
the market
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causes the price to be higher and a bubble is created.
It is worth noting that so far we have not assumed that the star investor has in-
deed access to special information which gives her the actual ability to make better
decisions. While it might be the case in the real world that big investment firms have
both better information and better ability to process this information, this model can be
taken to suggest that inexperienced traders may exaggerate those abilities and subse-
quently put more weight on the stars’ actions, more weight than the star action actually
deserve.
An interesting question arises. What would happen if the star investor in our model
can trade more than once? Is it possible that she starts to follow the herd which she
herself has helped to create, and if so, what will be the size of a possible bubble created
in this manner?
To answer these questions, we assume that, unlike other traders, the star trader can
indeed enter the market frequently. Furthermore, we assume that the trust of her fans
won’t decrease nor increase after each entry. 11
Now suppose that, for some exogenous reason, the star investor starts following
the herd. For instance, we can think of a situation in which the star trader indeed does
not get any informative signal, but is just summing up the information which is being
revealed by the price and announces her choice to the public. I conjecture that large
bubbles can exists in this scenario. This would be an example of a situation in which
already publicly available information can have a large impact. Simply because the
information is being announced by the star, her fans overreact to that information. The
diagram below explains this idea.
11In real world cases the trust or belief in the star will change from time to time. Imagine, for example,
an investor who follows a recommendation and makes good money. It is quiet possible that next time
around he will follow the star’s recommendations with more confidence.
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The Star acts All other traders, including
the star’s fans, see the star’s
action and act accordingly
the star sums up the info.
Implied by public behavior
and announces her action
- -
6
3.4 CONCLUSION
In the first part of this paper, we studied cases where the population of agents or a
part of that population is positively biased toward a special agent whom we called
“the star agent”. We showed how in a BHW framework this phenomenon will affect
the other agents’ behavior, and how imitative behavior can produce herd behavior and
informational cascades. In the second part of the paper we showed, that while the
market mechanism can prevent herd behavior from happening in a very simple setting,
it will fail to do so when the herd behavior is the result of a more complex belief
system.
One of the implicit implications of our study is that it suggests that a rise or fall
in prices of stocks of big investment banks may have a broader impact on the entire
market. This is because, besides the real effects that change in the price of a particular
stock might have on the market, a rise or fall in the price of stocks of the investment
banks will have the additional effect that the investors who have been following these
firms (being fans in our terminology) will revise their belief on the accuracy of the
information of these firms. For example, in the case of a price fall, the fan investors
might put much less weight on the recommendations given by their star or even re-
visit their previous investment decisions which were done in accordance to the actions
previously taken by the star, resulting in a further decline. To give a measure of herd
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behavior or to determine when herding is happening, is difficult.12 However, it is pos-
sible to measure and test the correlation of stock prices with the movements in the
stock price of big financial firms, specially in times of bubbles.
This study also might be able to shed some light on the question of why announce-
ments of already published information sometimes have a substantial effect on the
stock prices. Another implication of our study suggest that when there are a lot of in-
experienced traders in the market, and the sources who are trusted by the public fail to
provide carefully crafted and implied analysis, and instead they themselves are being
driven by the public’s actions, the probability of crisis is very high.
12See Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) for references.
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A.0 PROOFS AND SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 1
Proof of proposition 1:
Proof. First we derive an expression for ℓn(θ) and then use that to prove the theorem.
using Lagrange multipliers, and setting up the optimization problem we arrive at
L(θ,λ,µ) =
n
∑
i=1
log(pi)−µ
( n
∑
i=1
pi−1
)
−nλ′
n
∑
i=1
pigi(θ) (A.0.1)
doing the optimization we get
pi =
1
n(1+λ′gi(θ))
(A.0.2)
applying the moment conditions and we have
0 =
n
∑
i=1
pigi(θ) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
1
1+λ′gi(θ)
gi(θ), (A.0.3)
because of condition 0≤ pi ≤ 1, it is necessary for λ and θ to satisfy 1+λ′gi(θ)≥ 1/n
for each i. For fix θ, let
Dθ = {λ : 1+λ′gi(θ)≥ 1/n}, (A.0.4)
Dθ is convex and closed, and it is bounded if 0 is inside the convex hull of the gi(θ)′s.
Furthermore
∂
∂λ
[
− 1
n
n
∑
i=1
1
1+λ′gi(θ)
gi(θ)
]
=−1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)g′i(θ)(
1+λ′gi(θ)
)2 (A.0.5)
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is negative definite for every λ in Dθ, provided that ∑ni=1 gi(θ)g′i(θ) is positive definite.
Therefore, by inverse function theorem, λ = λ(θ) is a continuous differentiable func-
tion of θ.
Now for every θ ∈ {θ : ||θ−θ0||= n−1/3}, let θ = θ0 +un−1/3, where ||u||= 1. When
E[||g(x,θ)||3] < ∞ and ||θ0−θ|| ≤ n−1/3 we have
λ(θ) =
[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)g′i(θ)
]−1[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)
]
+o(n−1/3) (a.s) (A.0.6)
uniformly around θ ∈ {θ : ||θ−θo|| ≤ n−1/3}. Doing a Taylor series expansion, and
plug in the expression we derived for λ we get uniformly for u
ℓn(θ) =
n
∑
i=1
λ′(θ)gi(θ)− 12
n
∑
i=1
[λ′(θ)gi(θ)]2 +o(n1/3) (A.0.7)
plug in λ(θ), which we calculated before, to this equation we get
ℓn(θ) =
1
2
[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)
]′[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)g′i(θ)
]−1[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)
]
+o(n1/3) (a.s).
(A.0.8)
Using
Wn(θ) =
1
2
[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)g′i(θ)
]−1
(A.0.9)
and for large enough n we can rewrite the objective function of the Lasso estimator as
Ln(θ) =
[
n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)
]′
Wn(θ)
[
n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)
]
+λn
n
∑
j=1
|θ j|γ (A.0.10)
Now we can use this expression to prove the proposition 3:
I) First notice that if ˆθ minimizes Ln(θ), the it will minimize n−1 ×Ln(θ) too, and
therefore we can choose this object function to work with. We will denote it by Zn(θ).
First we realize that,
n−1
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ) = n−1
n
∑
i=1
(
gi(θ)−E[gi(θ)]
)
+n−1
n
∑
i=1
E[gi(θ)] (A.0.11)
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under assumption A2 we can use a well known result in empirical process theory, see
Andrews (1994) and obtain
1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
(
gi(θ)−E[gi(θ)]
)
= Op(1) (A.0.12)
furthermore, by assumption A3− (i)
E
[
n−1
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)
] p−→m1(θ). (A.0.13)
Putting all of these together and using assumption A4, and the fact that λn
n
→ λ0 ≥ 0,
we have
Zn(θ) =
[
n−1
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)
]′
Wn(θ)
[
n−1
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)
]
+
λn
n
n
∑
j=1
|θ j|γ = (A.0.14)
[
n−1
n
∑
i=1
(
gi(θ)−E[gi(θ)]
)
+n−1
n
∑
i=1
E[gi(θ)]
]′
Wn(θ)
[
n−1
n
∑
i=1
(
gi(θ)−E[gi(θ)]
)
+n−1
n
∑
i=1
E[gi(θ)]
]
+
λn
n
n
∑
j=1
|θ j|γ p−→ m1(θ)′W (θ)m1(θ)+λ0
p
∑
j=1
|θ j|γ = Z(θ).
This finishes the proof of the first part of proposition 3.
II) When λn = o(n), and all the assumptions are satisfied, uniformly in θ we have
λn
n
→ 0, when n goes to infinity. Therefore, we have uniformly in θ,
Zn(θ)
p−→ m1(θ)′W (θ)m1(θ) (A.0.15)
Since by assumption A3− (ii) there exist a unique minimizer for the last expression,
using Corollary 3.2.3 of Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996), we have the consistency
result:
ˆθn = argmin
θ∈Θ
Zn(θ)
p−→ argmin
θ∈Θ
[
m1(θ)′W (θ)m1(θ)
]
= θ0. (A.0.16)
For the sake of completeness, bellow is Corollary 3.2.3 from Van der Vaan and Wellner
(1996).
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Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. As we showed in the proof of proposition 3, when E[ ‖ g(x,θ) ‖3 ] ≤ in f ty,
and ‖ θ−θ0 ‖≤ n−1/3, uniformly in θ we have
ℓn(θ) =
1
2
[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)
]′[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)g′i(θ)
]−1[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ)
]
+o(n1/3) (a.s).
(A.0.17)
Since ℓn(θ) is a continuous function around θ for every θ belonging to the ball ‖
θ− θ0 ‖≤ n−1/3, ℓn(θ) has a minimum value in the interior of this ball, which we
denote it by ˆθ. Now let’s define
V (u) =
1
2
[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0+
u
n1/2
)
]′[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0+
u
n1/2
)g′i(θ0+
u
n1/2
)
]−1[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0+
u
n1/2
)
]
(A.0.18)
−1
2
[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0)
]′[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0)g′i(θ0)
]−1[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0)
]
+λn
n
∑
j=1
[
|θ j0 + u j
n1/2
|γ−|θ j0|γ
]
+o(n1/3).
We can do this because
{θ :‖ θ−θ0 ‖≤ n−1/2} ⊆ {θ :‖ θ−θ0 ‖≤ n−1/3} (A.0.19)
which implies that
(θ0 +
u
n1/2
) ∈ {θ :‖ θ−θ0 ‖≤ n−1/3} (A.0.20)
Now, we can notice that Vn(u) is minimized at n1/2( ˆθn−θ0) = hatun. Therefore we
can write
uˆn = argmin
u∈K
Vn(u) (A.0.21)
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where K is a compact subset of Rp. In order to obtain the asymptotic distribution of
our estimator we first need to show the following convergence results.
Vn(u) =⇒V (u) (A.0.22)
and also
uˆ = Op(1). (A.0.23)
Using assumption A2, we can use theorem one in Andrews (1994) to obtain
n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
[
gi(θ0 +
u
n1/2
)−Egi(θ0 + u
n1/2
)
]
⇒Ψ(θ0)≡ N(0,Ω(θ0)) (A.0.24)
Also, expanding gi(θ0 + un1/2 around u = 0 using Taylor series expansion, and using
assumption A3− (ii), and noticing that Egi(θ0) = 0, uniformly in u we have
n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
E
[
gi(θ0 +
u
n1/2
)
]
=⇒ R(θ0)u. (A.0.25)
Combining the last two equations we arrive at
n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0 +
u
n1/2
) =⇒ Ψ(θ0)+R(θ0)u. (A.0.26)
Since in the theorem, we assumed that λn/nγ/2 → λ0 ≥ 0 we have, in other words,
λn = O(nγ/2) = o(n1/2). Therefore it follows that
λn
[
|θ j0 + u j
n1/2
|γ−|θ j0|γ
]
→ 0 (A.0.27)
whenever θ j0 6= 0 and
λn
[
|θ j0 + u j
n1/2
|γ−|θ j0|γ
]
→ λ0|u j|γ (A.0.28)
which means
λn
p
∑
j=1
[
|θ j0 + u j
n1/2
|γ−|θ j0|γ
]
→ λ0
p
∑
j=1
|u j|γ1{θ j0=0} (A.0.29)
91
combining all these equation we get
Vn(u)⇒
[
Ψ(θ0)+R(θ0)u
]′W (θ0)[Ψ(θ0)+R(θ0)u]− [Ψ(θ0)]′W (θ0)[Ψ(θ0)]
(A.0.30)
+λ0
p
∑
j=1
|u j|γ1{θ j0=0}
= u′R(θ0)′W (θ0)R(θ0)u+2u′R(θ0)′W (θ0)Ψ(θ0)+λ0
p
∑
j=1
|u j|γ1{θ j0=0} ≡V (u).
This proves thatVn(u) =⇒ V (u). To complete the proof we notice that, on the space
of functions with a topology in which convergence on compact sets implies uniform
convergence on these sets, To prove that argmin(Vn)
d−→ argmin(V ), it suffices to show
that argmin(Vn) = Op(1), see Kim and Pollard (1990). To prove this, let δ > 0 be a
positive constant such that λn/nγ/2 ≤ (λ0 +δ), the we have for all u, if n is sufficiently
large
Vn(u)≥ 12
[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0+
u
n1/2
)
]′[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0+
u
n1/2
)g′i(θ0+
u
n1/2
)
]−1[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0+
u
n1/2
)
]
(A.0.31)
−1
2
[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0)
]′[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0)g′i(θ0)
]−1[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0)
]
−λn
n
∑
j=1
| u j
n1/2
|γ
≥ 1
2
[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0+
u
n1/2
)
]′[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0+
u
n1/2
)g′i(θ0+
u
n1/2
)
]−1[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0+
u
n1/2
)
]
−1
2
[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0)
]′[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0)g′i(θ0)
]−1[ 1√
(n)
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0)
]
− (λ0 +δ)
n
∑
j=1
| u j
n1/2
|γ
= V ln(u)
now define the empirical process
Ψn(θ0 +
u
n1/2
) = n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
[
gi(θ0 +
u
n1/2
)−Egi(θ0 + u
n1/2
)
]
(A.0.32)
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also let
1
2
[1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(θ0)g′i(θ0)
]−1
= W (θ0 +
u
n1/2
), (A.0.33)
then we can rewrite V ln(u) as
V ln(u) =
[
Ψn(θ0 +
u
n1/2
)′W (θ0 +
u
n1/2
)Ψn(θ0 +
u
n1/2
)
]
(A.0.34)
+
[
2u′R(θ0)′W (θ0 +
u
n1/2
)Ψn(θ0 +
u
n1/2
)
]
+
[
u′R(θ0)′Ψn(θ0 +
u
n1/2
)R(θ0)u
]
−
[
Ψn(θ0)′Wn(θ0)Ψn(θ0)
]
+o(1)
−(λ0 +δ)
p
∑
j=1
|u j|γ.
The first term converges to the fourth term in the equation for V ln(u) also, when n is
large the second term is linear. Therefore, we have a quadratic term and the |u j|γ and,
because 0 < γ < 1, the quadratic term dominate all other terms, which implies that
argminV ln(u) = Op(1), and from the inequality we get
argminVn(u) = Op(1). (A.0.35)
Because our assumptions guarantee the uniqueness of argminVn(u), we can apply the-
orem 3.2.2 of Van der Vaat and Wellner (1996) to get the results.
Proof of proposition 3:
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Proof. Let Ln(θ) be the same as definition 1. The key idea is that to find an appropriate
linear approximation for Ln(θ)−Ln(θ0) characterized by stochastic equicontinuity. To
give a road map of our proof we notice that from the Rise representation theorem,
there exists v∗ ∈ ¯V such that f ′θ0(ˆθ−θ0) = 〈ˆθ−θ0,v∗〉, by screening the definition of
f ′θ0(ˆθ−θ0) we see that f (ˆθ)− f (θ0) can be linearly approximated by 〈ˆθ−θ0,v∗〉. It is
possible to derive a linear approximation for l(ˆθ,Xi)− l(θ0,Xi), linear in ˆθ−θ0. Since
L(θ) is just a summation of l(θ,Xi) we have a bridge between f and L. Now a linear
approximation of L(ˆθ)−L(θ0) will gives a linear approximation of f (ˆθ)− f (θ0). The
last step is to use the central limit theorem on this linear approximation. Since
l(ˆθ,Xi) = r(ˆθ−θ0,Xi)+ l(θ0,Xi)+ l′θ0(ˆθ−θ0,Xi) (A.0.36)
a simple summation and some algebraic manipulation yields
ln(ˆθ) = ln(θ0)−K(θ0,θ)+n−1/2νn
(
r(ˆθ−θ0,X)
)
+n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(ˆθ−θ0,X)
)
.
(A.0.37)
Now we notice that by definition 1 −O(ε2n) ≤ Ln(ˆθn−Ln(θ0). Combining this with
assumption A5− ii, A6 A7 gives
−O(ε2n)≤ Ln(ˆθn−Ln(θ0)≤−
1
2
‖ˆθn−θ0‖2 +n−1/2νn
(
r(ˆθ−θ0,X)
) (A.0.38)
+n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(ˆθ−θ0,X)
)
−λn(J(ˆθn)− J(θ0))+Op(εn)
≤−λn(J(ˆθn)− J(θ0))+Op(εn).
Therefore λn
(
J(ˆθn)− J(θ0)
) ≤ Op(εn). Because J(u∗) < ∞ and using assumption A6
we have
λn(J(θ∗(ˆθn,εn))− J(ˆθn))≤ cλnJ
(
εn[−ˆθn +θ0 +u∗]
) (A.0.39)
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≤ cλnεn
(
J(ˆθn−θ0)+ J(u∗)
)
= Op(ε2n)
for some c > 0. Now that we have controlled the penalty part and obtained a bound on
that we can turn our attention to Ln(ˆθn). From equation (2) we get
Ln(ˆθn) = Ln(θ0)−K(θ0,θ)+n−1/2νn
(
r(ˆθ−θ0,X)
) (A.0.40)
+n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(ˆθ−θ0,X)
)
+λnJ(ˆθ).
Noticing that ‖θ∗(ˆθn,εn)−θ0‖= ‖(1− εn)(ˆθn−θ0)+ εnu∗‖ ≤ δn the equation holds
if we replace ˆθn with θ∗(ˆθn,εn). If we do so and subtract the two equations we get
Ln(ˆθn) = Ln(θ∗(ˆθn,εn))−
[
K(θ0, ˆθ)−K(θ0,θ∗(ˆθn,εn))
] (A.0.41)
+n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(ˆθn−θ∗(ˆθn,εn),X)
)
+n−1/2νn
(
r(ˆθn−θ∗(ˆθn,εn),X)
)
+Op(ε2n)
= Ln(θ∗(ˆθn,εn))− 12
[‖ˆθn−θ0‖2−‖θ∗(ˆθn,εn)−θ0‖2]
+n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(ˆθn−θ∗(ˆθn,ε),X)
)
+Op(ε2n).
Using definition 1 and assumptions A6 and A7 we get
−Op(ε2n)≤−
1
2
(1− (1− εn)2)‖ˆθn−θ0‖2 +(1− ε)〈ˆθn−θ0,εnu∗〉 (A.0.42)
−n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(εn(u
∗− (ˆθn−θ0)),X)
)
+Op(ε2n)
≤−εn‖ˆθn−θ0‖2 +(1− ε)〈ˆθn−θ0,εnu∗〉
−n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(εnu
∗,X)
)
+Op(ε2n)
≤ (1− ε)〈ˆθn−θ0,εnu∗〉−n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(εnu
∗,X)
)
+Op(ε2n)
Therefore
−(1− εn)〈ˆθn−θ0,u∗〉+n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(u
∗,X)
)
= Op(εn)+Op(εn) (A.0.43)
= op(n
−1/2).
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If we replace u∗ with −u∗ in the last equation and then put them together we arrive at
the following equation
|〈ˆθn−θ0,u∗〉−n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(u
∗,X)
)|= op(n−1/2). (A.0.44)
Therefore 〈ˆθn − θ0,v∗〉 = n−1/2νn
(
l′θ0(v
∗,X)
)
+ op(n
−1/2
. From this equation and
(4.22) we have
f (ˆθn)− f (θ0) = f ′θ0(ˆθn−θ0)+op(un‖ˆθn−θ0‖w) (A.0.45)
= 〈ˆθn−θ0,v∗〉+op(n−1/2)
= n−1
n
∑
i=1
l′θ0(v
∗,Xi)+op(n−1/2).
Therefore n1/2
( f (ˆθn)− f (θ0)) = n−1/2 ∑ni=1 l′θ0(v∗,Xi)+op(1) and the result follows
by applying the central limit theorem on n−1/2 ∑ni=1 l′θ0(v∗,Xi).
Proof of corollary 2:
Proof. If we replace v∗ with s in proposition 3, the result is corollary 2.
Proof of proposition 4:
Proof. The following lemma is needed in the proof of proposition 2. The proof can be
find in Shen and Wong (1994). Also here we define the Hellinger metric entropy with
bracketing, which we are using the assumption A?.
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Definition 14:
Let f : Θ×X → R with E[ f 2(θ,X)] < ∞ for all θ ∈ Θ and let ‖.‖2 be the usual L2
norm. Let
F = { f (θ, .) : θ ∈Θ, ‖ f‖2 < ∞}. (A.0.46)
For any given ε > 0, if there exists
S(ε,n) = { f l1, f u1 , . . . , f ln, f un } ⊂ L2 (A.0.47)
with max1≤ j≤n ‖ f uj − f lj‖2ε such that for every f ∈ F there exists a j such that f lj ≤
f ≤ f uj a.s., then S(ε,n) is called a bracketing ε-covering of F with respect to ‖‖2 .
H(ε,F ) = logN(ε,F ) is called the Hellinger L2 metric entropy of F with bracketing,
where
N(ε,F ) = min{n : S(ε,n) is a bracketing ε− covering o f F }. (A.0.48)
The Hellinger metric entropy of F with bracketing is the logarithm of the cardinality
of ε− cover of F of smallest size. when appropriately defined, it provides a mea-
sure of the size of parameter space. For more discussions about metric entropy see
Kolmogorov and Tihomirov (1961).
Lemma 4:
Suppose assumption A11 is satisfied, and let v2 ≥ supθ∈A n−1 ∑ni=1V (θ0,θ) and b ≥
supθ∈A ‖θ−θ0‖. Also assume that
Z U
L
H1/2(u,A)du≤ (n1/2Ma3/2)/210 (A.0.49)
where U = H−(Ψ(M,v),A and L = aM/28 (0< a< 1), and Ψ(M,v) = (1−a)nM2/[2(v2+
bM/3)]. Then
P∗
(
sup
θ∈A
νn
(
l(θ,X)− l(θ0,X)
))≤ 3exp(−Ψ(M,v)). (A.0.50)
If U ≤ L the above inequality continues to hold with 1 replacing 3.
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The idea of proof is to control and bound the mean and variance of the criterion
differences when it is evaluated at θ0 and θ ∈ Θ. Without loss of generality we can
assume that max(λn,ε)≤ 1. For any i, j ≥ 1 we have
inf
Ai, j
{
K(θ,θ0)+λn(J(θ)− J(θ0))
}
≥ (2i−1ε)2 +λn(2 j−1−1)J(θ0), (A.0.51)
and
inf
Ai,0
{
K(θ,θ0)+λn(J(θ)− J(θ0))
}
≥ (2i−1ε)2−λnJ(θ0). (A.0.52)
Since max(J(θ0),1)≤ c7ε2, we have
I = P∗
(
sup
{ρ(θ0,θ)≥ε,θ∈Θ}
n−1
n
∑
i=1
(
ℓ(θ,Xi)− ℓ(θ0,Xi)
)≥−ε2/2) (A.0.53)
=
∞
∑
i, j=1
P∗
(
sup
A(i, j)
νn(l(θ,X)− l(θ0))≥M(i, j)
)
+
∞
∑
i, j=1
P∗
(
sup
A(i,0)
νn(l(θ,X)− l(θ0))≥M(i,0)
)
= I1 + I2,
where
M(i, j) = 1
2
λn
[
(2i−1)2 +(2 j−1−1)J(θ0)
]
. (A.0.54)
Now we separately bound I1 and I2. To do this we use lemma 2. Because it is very
similar to establish the bounds for I1 and I2, we just show the it for I1. To bound I1 we
verify that lemma 2 is indeed applicable. By assumption A6, when
Mb/v2 ≤ 3, and Ψ(M,v)≥ (1−a)nM2/4v2 (A.0.55)
we have
sup
A(i, j)
V (θ0,θ)≤ v2(i, j) = c1(2iε)2(1+((2i)2 +2 jJ(θ0))β). (A.0.56)
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Similarly, when Mb/v2 ≤ 3, and U ≤M1/2(i, j)B1/2(i, j) we have H−(Ψ(M,v),A)≤
v(i, j). By assumption A7 we have
Z max(v(i, j),M1/2(i, j)B(i, j))
aM(i, j)
H1/2
(
u,B(2iε,2 j)
)
du/M(i, j)≤ c5n1/2. (A.0.57)
Therefore the requirement of the lemma 2 is satisfied and we have: (using the inequal-
ity (a+b)c ≤ ac +bc for a,b > 0, and 0 < c < 1.)
I1 ≤ 3
∞
∑
i=1
∞
∑
j=1
exp
(
− c8n min
(
M2(i, j)/v2(i, j),M(i, j)/B(i, j))) (A.0.58)
≤ 3
∞
∑
i=1
∞
∑
j=1
exp
(
− c8n min
(
(λ2n/ε2)[(2i−1)2 +2 j−1]1−β,λn[(2i−1)2 +2 j−1]1−γ
))
.
A similar reasoning bounds I2. Putting them together yields
I ≤ 6exp(− c8n min(λ2n/ε2,λn))/[1− exp(−c8n min(λ2n/ε2,λn))] (A.0.59)
≤ 7exp(−c8n min(λ2n/ε2,λn)).
This finishes the proof.
Proof of corollary 3:
Proof. By definition 1, for every εn > 0, which satisfies (4.22), there exists c > 0 such
that:
P
(
ρ(θ0, ˆθ≥ εn
)≤ P∗( sup
{ρ(θ0,ˆθ)≤εn,θ∈Θ}
(Ln(θ)−Ln(θ0))≤−an
)
(A.0.60)
P∗
(
sup
{ρ(θ0,ˆθ)≤εn,θ∈Θ}
(Ln(θ)−Ln(θ0))≤−cε2n
)
.
By proposition 4, ρ(θ0, ˆθn) = Op(εn whenever we have max
(
J(θ0),1
)
λn ≤ c?ε2n, and
εn is the smallest ε which satisfies (4.22). Therefore replacing εn with λ−1/2n whenever
max
(
J(θ0),1
)
λn ≤ c?ε2n results in rho(θ0, ˆθ) = Op(λ1/2n ). Now the results directly
follows from proposition 4.
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B.0 PROOFS AND SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 2
In this appendix we provide the proofs for the lemmas and propositions which ap-
peared earlier in chapter 2.
Proof of lemma 1:
Proof. The proof is simple and somewhat mechanical. We find a transformation that,
for every wi and pi produce a ϖi and a qi in such a way that ∑ni=1 qi = 1, this proves
lemma 1.
Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) and w = (w1, . . . ,wn) are give; define PN = ∑Ni=1 pi and let
qi =
pwii
PN . Now, the problem
min
p1,...,pn
n
∑
i=1
−wi log pi (B.0.1)
subject to:
n
∑
i=1
pigi(θ) = 0 and
n
∑
i=1
pi = 1 (B.0.2)
can be transformed to:
min
q1,...,qn
n
∑
i=1
− logqi (B.0.3)
subject to:
n
∑
i=1
qigi(θ)ϖi = 0 and
n
∑
i=1
qi = 1 (B.0.4)
with qi =
pwii
PN and ϖi =
p1−1/wii
PwiN
.
Because this transformation is one to one, if the first problem has a solution the second
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problem will have one and vice versa.
Proof of lemma 2:
Proof. The existence of a solution, ˆθ(w) and pˆ(w), is a consequence of maximization
of a convex function on a compact sent. Virtually the same reasons that grantee the ex-
istence of a solution to the EL procedure, as long as we maintain the same assumptions
like the compactness of the Θ. Obviously any solution of this problem will depend on
the w = (w1, . . . ,wn).
let ˆθ(w) and pˆ(w) be a pair that minimize the objective function with the given
constrains. The constrains are ∑ni=1 pigi(θ) = 0 and ∑ni=1 pi = 1, because any solution
has to satisfy these constrains, ˆθ(w) and pˆ(w) satisfy these constrains too. Therefore
n
∑
i=1
pˆi(w)gi(ˆθ(w)) = 0 (B.0.5)
which is the sample moment conditions.
Proof of proposition 2:
Proof. Let
ℓ(β,σ2) =−2log(nnL(β,σ2)) (B.0.6)
be the log empirical likelihood ratio. Using Lagrange multipliers to optimize ℓ(β,σ2)
we get
L(β,σ2,λ,µ) =
n
∑
i=1
log(pi)−µ
( n
∑
i=1
pi−1
)
−nλ′
n
∑
i=1
pigi(β,σ2) (B.0.7)
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doing some algebra we see that
pi =
1
n(1+λ′gi(β,σ2)) (B.0.8)
and λ(β,σ2) minimizes ℓ(β,σ2) therefore the log empirical likelihood ratio, which we
seek to minimize is:
ℓ(β,σ2) = 2
n
∑
i=1
log{1+λ′gi(β,σ2)} (B.0.9)
and λ ∈Rq satisfies
∂ℓ(β,σ2)
∂λ =
n
∑
i=1
gi(β,σ2)
1+λ′gi(β,σ2) = G1n(β,σ
2,λ) = 0 (B.0.10)
differentiating ℓ(β,σ2) with respect to β and σ2, we have:
∂ℓ(β,σ2)
∂β = λ
′
n
∑
i=1
∂gi(β,σ2)/∂β
1+λ′gi(β,σ2) = G2n(β,σ
2,λ) (B.0.11)
∂ℓ(β,σ2)
∂σ2 = λ
′
n
∑
i=1
∂gi(β,σ2)/∂σ2
1+λ′gi(β,σ2) = G3n(β,σ
2,λ) (B.0.12)
let’s denote
A = E
[
g1(β,σ2)g′1(β,σ2)
] (B.0.13)
and
B =
(
E
[∂g1(β,σ2)
∂β
]
,E
[∂g1(β,σ2)
∂σ2
]) (B.0.14)
Under assumptions A1−A4, the solution ( ˆβ, σˆ2, ˆλ) to this problem is triple such that,
see for example Qin and Lawless (1994), G1n( ˆβ, σˆ2, ˆλ) = 0, G2n( ˆβ, σˆ2, ˆλ) = 0, G3n( ˆβ, σˆ2, ˆλ) =
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0. In this case the empirical likelihood ration ℓ(β,σ2) attains its minimum at ( ˆβ, ˆσ2)
and ˆλ = λ( ˆβ, ˆσ2). This results in a an asymptotic limit


√
(n)( ˆβ−β0)√
(n)(σˆ2−σ20)

 d−→ N(0,Σ)1 (B.0.15)
where Σ = (B′A−1B)−1. Therefore we can drive the asymptotic variance of the empir-
ical likelihood estimators ˆβ and ˆsigma2. After some simple algebra we can convince
ourselves that Σ
ˆβ = (Ip,0)Σ(Ip,0)
′ and Σσˆ2 = (1,0)Σ(1,0)′. The corresponding asymp-
totic variance of the usual EL estimator, without using the modulation method is the
same as the asymptotic variance of quasi-likelihood estimator which for ˘βql is:
Σ
˘βql = σ
2
(
E
[
G′(X ′β)2XX ′/V])−1 (B.0.16)
A standard estimator for σ2 is
σ˘2 = n−1
n
∑
i=1
(
(Yi−G(X ′i ˘βql))/V (G(X ′i ˘βq))
)
(B.0.17)
which we denote its asymptotic variance by Σ
˘βql . Now we are in a position to compare
these variances and drive the optimum weights. We need the following definitions:
µ3 = E
[(
ε/(σ
√
(V ))
)3|X] (B.0.18)
µ4 = E
[(
ε/(σ
√
(V ))
)4|X] (B.0.19)
A11 = σ4Σ−1breveβql = σ
2E
[G′(X ′β)2
V
XX ′
]
(B.0.20)
1The derivation is a standard practice in the literature, for example see Qin and Lawless (1994) for
detailed derivations and proofs of the asymptotic limit theorems.
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A22 =

 E
[µ4−1
σ4
]
E
[µ4−1
σ4
w′
]
E
[µ4−1
σ4
w′
]
E
[µ4−1
σ4
ww′
]

 (B.0.21)
A12 =
(
E
[µ3G′(X ′β)
σ
√
(V )
]
,E
[µ3G′(X ′β)
σ
√
(V )
Xw′
]) (B.0.22)
B1 =
(
E
[V ′G′(X ′β)
σ2V
X
]
,E
[V ′G′(X ′β)
σ2V
Xw′
]) (B.0.23)
and finally
B2 =
( 1
σ4
,E
[w′
σ4
])
. (B.0.24)
Doing some tidies algebra we obtain,
A =

A11 A12
A′12 A22

 (B.0.25)
and
B′ =−

σ−2A11 B1
0 B2

 . (B.0.26)
Under the assumptions A1−A4 we can calculate to get
B′A−1B =

σ−4A11 0
0 0

+B1
(
A−122.1−
A−122.1B
′
2B2A
−1
22.1
B2A−122.1B′2
)
B′1 (B.0.27)
whit
A−122.1 =
σ4
k−1

1+E(w′)D−1E(w) −E(w′)D−1
−D−1E(w) D−1

 (B.0.28)
where D = cov(w). Doing some algebra reveals that
B′2B2 =
1
σ8

 1 E(w)
E(w′) E(w)E(w′)

 (B.0.29)
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and (
A−122.1−
A−122.1B
′
2B2A
−1
22.1
B2A−122.1B′2
)
=
σ4
k−1

1 0
0 0

 . (B.0.30)
Therefore,
B1
(
A−122.1−
A−122.1B
′
2B2A
−1
22.1
B2A−122.1B′2
)
B′1 =
σ4
k−1B1
(
E(w′),−1)D−1(E(w′),−1)B′1 =C(w)C′(w)/(k−1)
(B.0.31)
and doing some algebra we have
C(w) =
(
E
[V ′G′(X ′β)Xw′
V
]−E[V ′G′(X ′β)
V
Xw′
]
E(w′)
)
D−1/2 = E
[
V ′G′(X ′β)X
V
(w′−E(w′))D−1/2
]
(B.0.32)
Using the above calculations we can show that,
Σhatβ(w) = (Ip,0)Σ−1(Ip,0)′ =
(A11
σ4
+
C(w)C′(w)
k−1
)−1
. (B.0.33)
For any two any two positive definite and symmetric n×n matrices A and B we have
A−B > 0 if and only if B−1−A−1 > 0, Therefore finding a w to maximize Σ
˘β−Σ ˆβ(w)
is equivalent to finding w to maximize C(w)C′(w). Let define η = V
′G′(X ′β)X
V and
ξ =(w′−E(w′)) form the equation for C(w) we obtained above we have C(w) = E[ηξ].
Now we can write C(w)C′(w) = E(ηξ′)[E(ξξ′)]−1E(ξη) by the lemma which will
follow this proof we have
C(w)C′(w)≤ E[
(
V ′G′(X ′β))2XX ′
V 2
] (B.0.34)
and the equality holds if and only if
η =
(
E(ηξ′)[E(ξξ′)]−1
)
ξ (B.0.35)
It can be directly check that the equality is hold when w = V
′G′(X ′β)X
V , and this finishes
the proof.
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The following lemma was used in the last step of the proof of proposition 2.
Lemma 5:
If ξ and η are to n-dimensional and m-dimensional random variables and n ≤ m,
E[||ξ||2 + ||η||2] < ∞ and E[ξξ′] > 0, then E(ηξ′)[E(ξξ′)]−1E(ξη′) ≤ E(ηη′). Fur-
thermore, equality holds if and only if η =
(
E(ηξ′)[E(ξξ′)]−1
)
ξ.
Proof. Let c =
(
E(ηξ′)[E(ξξ′)]−1
)
, because E[||ξ||2+ ||η||2]<+∞, we have E[(cξ−
η)(cξ−η)′] ≥ 0 implies that cE(ηη′)c′− cξη′−ηξ′c′ + ηη′ ≥ 0. Replacing c with(
E(ηξ′)[E(ξξ′)]−1
)
we get E(ηξ′)[E(ξξ′)]−1E(ξη′)≤ E(ηη′). Equality holds if and
only if E[(cξ−η)(cξ−η)′] = 0, which implies η = cξ.
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C.0 PROOFS AND SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 3
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. First, notice that
f ′(x) = p(1− p)
((1− p)x+ p(1− x)) > 0 (C.0.1)
which implies that this function is increasing for 0≤ p ≤ 1.
Second, we have f (x) < x. To see this, notice that
f (x) < x⇔ (1− p)x < (1− p)x2 + p(1− x)x ⇔ x(1− x) > 0.
The last statement is always true because 0 < x = pi∗ < 1.
Third, if
{an = f n(pi∗)}n=∞n=1 , then lim
n→∞an = 0
This is so because f (x)< x and f (x) is increasing together. These imply that { f n(pi∗)}∞0
is a bounded and decreasing sequence of real numbers and, therefore, has a limit. Let
limn→∞ an = a0 > 0. Then, f (a0) < a0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, an has to
converge to a fixed point of f (x), which is zero.
The above argument shows that
∃n s.t. f n(pi∗)≤ 1/2 (C.0.2)
107
and, therefore,
{m| f n(pi∗)≤ 1/2} 6= /0. (C.0.3)
Hence the minimum exists.
Now suppose that pi < pi′. We have:
pi < pi′⇒ f (pi) < f (pi′)⇒∀m f m(pi) < f m(pi′)⇒ ( f m(pi′)≤ 1/2→ f m(pi)≤ 1/2)
(C.0.4)
this implies that
{m| f m(pi)≤ 1/2} ⊆ {m| f m(pi′)≤ 1/2}. (C.0.5)
Therefore,
min{m| f m(pi)≤ 1/2} ≤ min{m| f m(pi′)≤ 1/2}, (C.0.6)
which is to say, n≤ n′.
Proof of proposition 3:
Proof. Suppose that at time t an agent defects and chooses the opposite outcome of the
cascade. With probability 1−µ the next actor is a fan who, by assumption, receives a
negative signal (here negative means a signal which points to the opposite direction of
the cascade). His updated belief is
f 2(pi∗) > 1/2, since we haven > 2. (C.0.7)
Therefore
E[V = 1|Ht+1] = Pf (V = 1|Ht+1) > 1/2, (C.0.8)
so is optimal for him to follow the cascade. If the next agent is a fan, he will perform
the same calculation and will defect only if f 3(pi∗)≤ 1/2 and that is so if n = 3. Contin-
uing this argument, a fan with an n given by lemma 1 will defect only if f n(pi∗)≤ 1/2,
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which requires that the last n−1 agents are defectors and that is so if all of them are
non-fans which happens with probability (1−µ)(n−1). In this case, the cascade breaks
at time t+n. Therefore the defection is successful with probability
(1−µ)(n−1). (C.0.9)
Proof of the proposition 4:
Proof. Let’s suppose there are two actions a and b to be chosen and a fan, f , sophis-
ticated enough to take in to account the possibility of herd, resulting from the action
he is about to choose. Also, suppose the star has chosen action a. Because n > 2 by
proposition 1 more than 2 opposite signals are needed for this fan to choose b. Now
suppose that every of the k predecessors has chosen b, and k is arbitrary large. The
only information that f can extract from this chain of actions is that the star received
a signal. The first two non-stars had b signals, and the rest of the population is in an
informational cascade. Since f needs more than 2 b signals in order to choose action
b, she will follow the star and choose a.
Proof of Porposition 5:
Proof. Because non-fan traders fallow their own signal, their participation helps to
control any miss-pricing. Therefore, in order to find an upper bound for any possible
bubble, we can assume that all traders are fans.
Suppose everybody receives a negative signal but after weighting in her/his initial
belief decides to buy. How long can this process continue? As soon as g(pi∗)≤ f m(p),
the mth trader stops buying. Therefore, the length of the buying process is
n = min{m|g(pi∗)≤ f m(p)}. (C.0.10)
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The next step is to investigate how much a bubble can grow during these n periods. If
the market maker could see the actual signals he would have set the price according to
β = gn(p). Since, he cannot see the actual signals and he only observes the “buy” and
“sell” actions, he increases the price according to ¯β. Therefore, the size of the bubble
is
¯β−β (C.0.11)
Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. In the proof of proposition 3 we assumed that all traders are fans, which implies
that no correction takes place and the size of any possible bubble rapidly grows until it
reaches the established upper bound. Now, if we take into consideration the presence
of noise traders and non-fans, we are going to have an asymmetric random walk on R
which moves up and down with different probabilities depending on the combination
of fans, non-fans, and the noise traders. The following lemma is the core part of the
proof.
Lemma 6:
Let X1,X2, . . . be i.i.d with
P(Xi = 1) = p and P(Xi =−1) = 1− p p > 1/2
and let
Sn = X1 +X2 + · · ·+Xn α = in f{n : Sn > 0} β = in f{n : Sn < 0}.
Then,
(i) P(α < ∞) = 1 and P(β < ∞) < 1.
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(ii) I f Y = infSn, thenP(Y ≤−k) = P(β < ∞)k.
(iii)Eα = 12p−1 .
Proof. Sketch of a proof:
(i): We need the following result for the proof of this part this can be found as theorem
in “Probability: Theory and Examples by Richard Durrett.”
Theorem 1:
For a random walk on R there are only four possibilities, one of which has probability
one.
(1) Sn = 0, for all n.
(2) Sn → ∞.
(3) Sn →−∞.
(4) −∞ = limin f Sn < limsupSn = ∞.
We also need the following statement in the proof.
Let α and β be the same as above. Then the four possibilities of the theorem correspond
to the following four combinations P(α < ∞) < 1or = 1 and P(β < ∞) < 1or = 1.
Part (i) of the lemma can easily be derived from the fact that
P(β < ∞) < P(α < ∞). (C.0.12)
(ii): This part is obvious when we consider that the Si,s are independent, and Y ≤
Si , ∀i.
(iii) A result in stopping time theory -sometimes referred to as Wald’s equation- states
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that:
If X1,X2, . . . are i.i.d with E|Xi|< ∞, and if τ is a stopping time with Eτ < ∞, then:
ESτ = EX1Eτ. (C.0.13)
Apply Wald’s equation to the stopping time α∧n and let n→ ∞ to obtain:
Eα =
1
EX1
=
1
2p−1 . (C.0.14)
The only thing that remains is to calculate the probability of a “buy” which moves
the price up. This probability is 1/3(1−µ)+γ. Now to prove part (a), notice that when
γ = 1/6 + 1/3µ the 1/3(1− µ)+ γ = 1/2, and we have a symmetric random walk in
which Prob(T < ∞) = 1, and E[T ] = ∞.
For part (b), if γ < 1/6 +1/3µ, then 1/3(1−µ)+ γ < 1/2 and, therefore, we have an
asymmetric random walk, thus, by part (i) of lemma 3, P(T < ∞) < 1. In additions,
by part (ii) of the lemma 3,
P(T < ∞) = P(β < ∞)n. (C.0.15)
For part (c), notice that if γ > 1/6 +1/3µ, we have an asymmetric random walk with
the probability going up greater than the probability of going down. By part (i) of
lemma 3, Prob(T < ∞) = 1 and by part (iii) of lemma 3, we have
E[T ] =
n
2p−1 , (C.0.16)
where p is the probability of going up.
112
D.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALTONJI, J. and L.M. SEGAL, “Small Sample Bias in GMM Estimation of Covari-
ance Structures,” Journal Business and Economic Statistics, 1996, 14, 353–366.
ANDERSON, D. W. K., “Consistent Moment Selection Procedures for Generalized
Method of Moments Estimation,” Econometrica, 1999, 67, 543–564.
ANDREWS, D.W. and B. LU, “Consistent Model and Moment Selection Procedures
for GMM Estimation with Application to Dynamic Panel Data Models,” Journal
of Econometrics, 2001, 101, 123–165.
ANDREWS, D.W.K., “Empirical Process Methods in Econometrics,” in R.F. Engle
and D. McFadden, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, 1 ed., Vol. 4, Elsevier, 1986,
chapter 37, pp. 2247–2294.
AVERY, P. and P. ZEMSKY, “Multidimentional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in
Financial Markets,” American Economic Review, 1998, 88, 724–48.
BACK, K. and D. BROWN, “Implied Probabilities in GMM Estimators,” Economet-
rica, 1993, 61, 971–976.
BALA, V. and S. GOYAL, “Learning from Neighbours,” The Review of Economic
Studies, 1998, 65 (3), 595–621.
BANERJEE, A., “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 1992, 107, 797–818.
113
BERAN, R. and L. D ¨UMBGEN, “Modulation of estimators and confidence sets,”
The Annals of Statistics, 1998, 26, 1826–1856.
BIKHCHANDANI, S. and S. SHARMA, “Herd Behavior in Financial Markets,”
IMF Staff Papers, 2000, 47 (3), 279–310.
, D. HIRSHLEIFER, and I. WELCH, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy,
1992, 100, 992–1026.
BREIMAN, L., “Heuristics of Instability and Stabilization in Model Selection,” An-
nals of Statistics, 1996, 24, 2350–2383.
CANER, M., “LASSO Type GMM Estimator,” Econometric Theory, Forthcoming,
2008.
CHAMBERLIAN, G., “Econometrics and Decision Theory,” Journal of Economet-
rics, 2000, 95, 255–283.
CHEN, X.S. and H. CUI, “An Extended Empirical Likelihood For Generalized Linear
Models,” Statistica Sinica, 2003, 13, 69–81.
CORCORAN, S.A., “Bartlett Adjustment of Empirical Discrepancy Statistics,”
Biometrika, 1998, 85, 967–972.
COX, D. D. and F. O’SULLIVAN, “Asymptotic Analysis of Penalized Likelihood
and Related Estimators,” The Annals of Statistics, 1990, 21, 903–924.
CRESSIE, N. and T. READ, “Read, Multinomial Goodness of Fit Tests,” Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 1984, 46, 440–464.
DURRETT, A. R., Probability: Theory and Examples, Thomson Brooks/Cole, 2005.
FAN, J. and R. LI, “Variable Selection via Nonconcave Penalized Likelihood and
its Oracle Properties,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 2001, 96,
1348–1360.
114
and , “Variable Selection For Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model and Frailty
Model,” Annals of Statistics, 2002, 30, 74–99.
FRANK, I.E. and J.H. FRIEDMAN, “A Statistical View of Some Chemometrics
Regression Tools,” Technometrics, 1993, 35, 109–148.
FRENCH, S. and D.R. INSUA, Statistical Decision Theory, A Hodder Arnold Pub-
lication, 2000.
GEYER, C.J., “On the Asymptotics of Constrained Estimations,” Annals of Statistics,
1994, 22, 1993–2010.
GLOSTEN, R. L. and P. R. MILGROM, “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 1985, 14, 71–100.
GRAHAM, J. R., “Herding among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evidence,”
Journal of Finance, 1999, 54, 237–68.
HANSEN, L.P., “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Methods of Moments Esti-
mators,” Econometrica, 1982, 50, 1029–1054.
HEATON, J. HANSEN L.P. and A. YARON, “Finite-Sample Properties of Some Al-
ternative GMM Estimators,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 1996,
14, 262–280.
HIRANO, K., “Decision Theory in Econometrics,” Dept. of Economics, University of
Arizona Working Paper, 2006.
IMBENS, G.W., “One-Step Estimators for Over-Identified Generalized Method of
Moments Models,” Review of Economic Studies, 1997, 64, 369–408.
IMBENS, G.W. SPADY R.H. and P. JOHNSON, “Information Theoretic Ap-
proaches to Inference in Moment Condition Models,” Econometrica, 1998, 66,
333–357.
115
JAMES, W. and C. STEIN, “Estimation With Quadratic Loss,” in “Berkeley Sym-
posiume on Mathematical Statistics and Probability” Univ. of Calif. Press. 1961,
pp. 361–379.
JING, B.Y. and A.T.A. WOOD, “Exponential Empirical Likelihood is Not Bartlett
Correctable,” Annals of Statistics, 1996, 24, 365–369.
KABAILA, P., “The Effect of Model Selection on Confidence Regions and Prediction
Regions,” Econometric Theory, 1995, 11, 537–549.
KIM, J. and D. POLLARD, “Cube root asymptotics,” The Annals of Statistics, 1990,
18, 191–219.
KITAMURA, Y. and M. STUTZER, “An Information Theoretic Alternative to Gen-
eralized Method of Moments Estimation,” Econometrica, 1997, 65, 861–874.
KNIGHT, K., “Epi-Convergence in Distribution and Stochastic Equi-Semicontinuity,”
University of Toronto, Department of Statistics, Working Paper, 2003.
and W. FU, “Asymptotics for Lasso-type Estimators,” Annals of Statistics, 2000,
28, 1356–1378.
KOLACZY, E. D., “An Information Criterion for Empirical Likelihood with General
Estimating Equations,” 1995. unpublished manuscript-Department of Statistics,
University of Chicago.
KOLACZYK, E.D., “Empirical Likelihood For Generalized Linear Model,” Statistics
Sinica, 1994, 4, 199–218.
KOLMOGOROV, A. N. and V. M. TIHOMIROV, “ε-entropy and ε-capacity of Sets
in Function Spaces,” Uspekhil Math. Nauk., 1959, 14, 3–86. English translation,
American Math. Soc. Transl. 277-364 (1961).
LAZAR, A.N., “Bayesian Empirical Likelihood,” Biometrika, 2003, 90, 319–326.
LEHMANN, E.L. and G. CASELLA, Theory of Point Estimation, Springer-Verlag,
1998.
116
LINDSEY, J., Applying Generalized Linear Models, Springer-Verlag, 1997.
McCULLAGH, P. and J.A. NELDER, Generalized Linear Models, London: Chap-
man and Hall, 1990.
MILGROM, P. R. and N. STOKEY, “Information, Trade and Common Knowledge,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 1982, 26, 17–27.
MORRIS, C.N., “Parametric Empirical Bayes Inference: Theory and Applications,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1983, 78, 47–55.
NATTINGER, A. B. and OTHERS, “Effect of Nancy Reagan’s Mastectomy on
Choice of Surgery for Breast Cancer by US Women,” JAMA, 1998, 279, 762–
766.
NEWEY, W.K. and McFADDEN, “Large Sample Estimation and Hypothesis Test-
ing,” in R. F. Engle and D. McFadden, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 4,
Elsevier, 1986, chapter 36, pp. 2111–2245.
and R.J. SMITH, “Higher order properties of GMM and Generalized Empirical
Likelihood Estimators,” Econometrica, 2004, 72, 219–255.
OWEN, A.B., “Empirical Likelihood Ratio Confidence Intervals for a single Func-
tional,” Biometrika, 1988, 75, 237–249.
, Empirical Likelihood, London: Chapman and Hall, 2001.
POLLARD, D., Convergence of Stochastic Processes, New York: Springer-Verlag,
1984.
PRESTON, B. HOUNG H. and M. SHUM, “Generalized Empirical Likelihood-
Based Model Selection Criteria for Moment Condition Models,” Econometric
Theory, 2003, 19, 923–943.
QIN, J. and J. LAWLESS, “Empirical Likelihood and Generalized Estimating Equa-
tions,” Ann. Statist., 1994.
117
RAMALHO, J.S., “Small Sample Bias of Alternative Estimation Methdos for Mo-
ment Condition Models: Monte Carlo Evidence for Covariance Structures,” Stud-
ies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, 2005, 9 (1).
, “Bootstrap Bias-Adjusted GMM Estimators,” Economics letters, 2006, 92, 149–
155.
RAO, C. R. and Y. WU, “On Model Selection,” IMS Lecture Notes - Monograph
Series (2001) Volume 38 2001.
SCHARFSTEIN, D. S. and J. C. STEIN, “Herd Behavior and Investment,” American
Economic Review, 1990, 80 (3).
SCHENNACH, S.M., “Bayesian Exponentiaally Tilted Empirical Likelihood,”
Boimetrika, 2005, 92, 31–46.
, “Point Estimation with Exponentially Tilted Empirical Likelihood,” Ann.
Statist., 2007, 35, 634–672.
SCLOVE, S.L., “Improved Estimators for Coefficients in Linear Rergression,” Jour-
nal of American Statist. Assco., 1968, 63, 597–606.
SHEN, X., “On Method of Sieve and Penalization,” The Annals of Statistics, 1997, 25,
2555–2592.
, “On the Method of Penalization,” Statistica Sinica, 1998, 8, 337–357.
SIRVASTAVA, R. K. and OTHERS, “Market-Based Asset and Shareholder Value: A
Framework for Analysis,” Journal of Marketing, 1998.
SLATER, I. R., SOROS: The Unauthorized Biography, the Life, Times and Trading
Secrets of the World’s Greatest Investor, McGraw-Hill, 1997.
SMITH, R.J., “Alternative semi-parametric likelihood approaches to generalized
method of moments estimation,” Economic Journal, 1997, 107, 503–519.
, “Weak Instruments and Empirical Likelihood,” Working Paper, University of
Cambridge, 2005.
118
TAUCHEN, G., “Statistical Properties of Generalized Method-of-Moments Estima-
tors of Structural Parameters Obtained from Financial Market Data,” Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics, 1986, 4, 397–416.
TIBSHIRANI, R.J., “Regression Shrinkage and Selection Via Lasso,” Journal of The
Royal Statistical Society Series B, 1996, 58, 267–288.
TRUEMAN, B., “Analyst Forecasts and Herding Behavior,” eview of Financial Stud-
ies, 1994, 7, 97–124.
VAART, A.W. VAN DER and WELLNER, Weak Convergence and Empirical Pro-
cesses, New York: Springer Verlag, 1996.
WELCH, I., “Herding Among Security Analysts,” Journal of Financial Economics,
2000, 58 (3), 369–96.
WONG, W. H. and X. SHEN, “Probability Inequalities for Likelihood Ratios and
Convergence Rate of Sieve MLEs,” The Annals of Statistics, 1995, 18, 339–362.
ZHANG, J. and I. GIJBELS, “Sieve Empirical Likelihood and Extensions of the
Generalized Least Squares,” Scandinavian Journal of Statistics, 2003, 30, 1–24.
ZHAO, P. and B. YU, “On Model Selection Consistency of Lasso.,” Journal of Ma-
chine Learning Research, 2006, 7, 2541–2563.
ZWIEBEL, J., “Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation,” Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 1995, 103 (1), 1–25.
119
